

**BULGARIA: AN INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY CONTRIBUTOR**

**BULGARIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS**

A PARTNER IN TACKLING THE EMERGING THREATS

ANTI-TERRORIST POLICY

**SECURITY RISK REDUCTION: BULGARIA'S
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARMS CONTROL AND
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BULGARIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS*

Today, buzz words like ‘globalization’ and ‘interdependence’ are used in common parlance to describe the world we live in. These concepts have political consequences both at the local and international level. In the domain of domestic politics, a convergence of policies and merger between the Left and the Right has created the ‘Third Way’ phenomenon. Similarly, in the domain of international politics, integration has come to signify joint actions to uphold common interests and fight common problems. In contrast, security, though no longer defined solely in military terms, has disintegrated into ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ versions. However, in both cases, ‘security’ has ceased to be a term that is interchangeable with ‘survival’ and now denotes prosperity and economic development. Today membership in security organizations is as crucial as membership in international trade organizations.

Faced with the imperatives of simultaneous and “dual-track” post-communist transitions of political and economic reform, our country is actively engaged with this new political context. Bulgaria identifies its earliest possible NATO and EU accession to be of an immediate national interest and fundamental foreign policy priority. These orientations are motivated by Bulgaria’s adherence to the shared values of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and market economy. Therefore, in the course of the 1990s, the country was working hard to dismantle

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* This article expresses the personal views of the authors only. It does not necessarily reflect Bulgarian official positions.

the legacy of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Confronted with the necessity to coin an independent foreign policy for the first time since 1945, Bulgaria opted for membership in a complementary web of international organizations.

In economic terms, Bulgaria is today a member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the International Finance Co-operation, the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank. In 1996 Bulgaria joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), where Bulgaria's membership obligations are commensurate with liberal foreign trade practices. Bearing the repercussions of the economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria faced the harsh reality that alongside territorial defense and physical security, achieving prosperity and development has proved to be a vital national interest.

Another lesson learned implies that security challenges remain latent and, unless they are managed properly, can turn into security risks. This holds true especially for the post-Cold War security environment of regional ethnic conflicts, asymmetric threats and – after September 11 – the scourge of terrorism. Countering these new security risks is an all-encompassing endeavour to engage an array of actors. Regardless of military might or resources, no country could feel safe enough or cope on its own. Security through European and Euro-Atlantic co-operation emerged as the bottom line of Bulgaria's new foreign policy after 1989.

Thus, in 1994 Bulgaria was one of the first countries from the former communist bloc to accede to the NATO Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) and to become an Associate Partner of the Western European Union (WEU). Furthermore, in 1995 Bulgaria applied for membership in the EU and two years later, in 1997, officially stated its aspiration for the earliest possible NATO accession. The country was already a member of inclusive organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and witnessed their institutional readjustments after the collapse of the Eastern bloc.

Whilst acknowledging the comparative advantages of each organization, Bulgaria was quick to recognize that NATO continues to have a clear sense of purpose and meaning. It was the involvement of the Alliance that stopped the bloodshed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ended the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and prevented a war in the Republic of Macedonia. NATO, the sole institutional link between Europe and North America, remains the lynchpin of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Thus, joining NATO on the basis of an invitation at the Prague Summit in November 2002 has become Bulgaria's most immediate foreign policy priority.

BULGARIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS (UN)

A UN member since 1955, Bulgaria is a committed participant in the system of multiple, specialized organizations within the UN. Bulgaria is confident that, as the only organization to address security issues on a global scale, the UN has important comparative advantages in its role to promote peace and stability, solve problems peacefully, and, if need be, legitimize the use of force in international peacekeeping. Bulgaria is very appreciative of the ongoing trend within the UN to solve problems by consensus thus making it a unique international forum to bridge interests and policies that are sometimes contradictory.

Over the years Bulgaria has contributed to the efforts to finalize decolonization and solve problems peacefully. One example depicting this stance is Bulgaria's supportive positions, dating back to the 1960s and the 1980s, to pass key UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions No 242 on the Middle East (1967) and 598 (1987), the latter laying the groundwork for a peaceful settlement of the Iran-Iraq war.

Other practical tokens of Bulgaria's engagement with the UN objectives include participation in UN peacekeeping operations. So far, Bulgaria has sent contingents to the UN missions in Cambodia (1992), Angola (1995–1999), Tajikistan (1995–2001), Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000–2001), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1997 – present), Kosovo (2000 – present). It is worth emphasizing that Bulgaria has specialized in assignments related to the civil components of the peacekeeping missions. These assignments include building of democratic institutions, training of police personnel, organization and preparation of democratic elections and monitoring the respect for human rights.

Bulgaria's significant contributions to the UN objectives and missions have received due recognition. On October 8, 2001 Bulgaria was elected a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the period of 2002–2003. Bulgaria takes this as an international vote of confidence and recognition of Bulgaria's capacity to contribute to peace and security in regional and global terms. Bulgaria will now be in a position to actually formulate, present and uphold its positions given that it makes an effective use of its rights and obligations as a Security Council member state. To a great extent, Bulgaria's performance will be gauged by the ability to maintain close cooperation with the other UNSC members. Undoubtedly, performance in the UNSC will pro-

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vide yet another opportunity to demonstrate Bulgaria's potential as a credible and loyal partner of NATO and the EU. Bulgaria has already pledged to follow NATO and EU actions in the fight against terrorism.

Aiming to make full use of the UNSC tenure, Bulgaria has identified a package of action priorities. These encompass:

- *Countering international terrorism*

Bulgaria attaches great importance to the implementation of the global legal framework for the fight against terrorism that is constituted in the UNSC Resolutions 1269, 1368, 1373, and 1377 along with twelve relevant UN Conventions and Protocols on anti-terrorism issues. In September 2002 Bulgaria intends to launch an open debate on the fight against international terrorism. This event is scheduled to coincide with the Bulgarian UNSC Chairmanship, the opening of the UN General Assembly 57th Session, and the first anniversary of the tragic events of September 11. Bulgaria will propose a UNSC meeting at the highest level that will result in the adoption of a UNSC resolution or declaration.

- *Sanctions*

We believe that economic sanctions, as coercive measures imposed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, should be adequately focused and adjusted to specific situations. The SC has done considerable work in this context and Bulgaria will join the efforts targeted at enhancing the impact of sanctions whilst alleviating the humanitarian fall-out on civilians and the negative repercussions for third parties. Bulgaria will participate in present or future Committees on Sanctions. Bulgaria has already been elected as the chair of the Committee on the Sanctions against Somalia and a deputy chair of the Committees on Sanctions against Libya and Iraq.

- *Conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peace-making*

Bulgaria will promote the necessity for a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, management and resolution. Bulgaria deems it important to achieve a better coordination of the military, political and humanitarian efforts whilst making long-term planning of development assistance an integral part of peacemaking. Bulgaria will also support the implementation of the recommendations in the Brahimi Report to strengthen the

UN system of operational planning, resource allocation and efficient peace-keeping.

• *Regional and sub-regional organizations*

Bulgaria believes that regional or sub-regional organizations bear a special responsibility for security on a regional scale, given that their activities are commensurate with the UN aims and principles. Therefore the country will favor increasing the contacts and mechanisms of consultations between the UN and various regional organizations in the field of conflict prevention and settlement. In doing so, Bulgaria will build upon its leading role in multiple regional security co-operative endeavors such as the Multinational Peace Force Southeast Europe (SEEBRIG) and the process of Southeast Europe Defense Ministerials (SEDM). In a similar vein, Bulgaria aspires to promote co-operation between the UN and other regional organizations, the OSCE including.

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• *Africa*

Bulgaria believes that the problems of Africa should encompass a wide range of measures and assistance. At the same time Bulgaria deems it important to help African countries build their capacity to shoulder greater responsibilities in securing peace and sustainable development on the continent. Bulgaria will render increasing assistance, within its capacity, for the successful inauguration of the new African development initiative known as NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development) that was approved by the G-8 and authorized African state leaders in September-October 2001. Bulgaria also believes that the efforts to counter the AIDS epidemic in Africa and help its victims should continue to be a leading priority of the UN, including the UNSC.

• *Transparency in the work of the UNSC and enhancement of its role and efficiency in the maintenance of international peace and security*

Bulgaria will encourage further transparency and efficiency of the UNSC working methods. Bulgaria considers it important to engage as many member states as possible in the activities of the UNSC. As a corollary, the UN Secretariat should be strengthened in ways that allow the efficient application of the UNSC Resolutions.

BULGARIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)

Bulgaria is the OSCE Chairman-in-office candidate for 2004.

A founding member of the Helsinki Process in 1975, today Bulgaria is the OSCE Chairman-in-office candidate for 2004. The bid for the Chairmanship signifies Bulgaria's view that the OSCE has an important place in the European security architecture, given its comprehensive approach to co-operative security. This was reaffirmed in the Charter on European Security, approved at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 2000. The OSCE, given its inclusive 55-country membership, contributes to stability and security by its unique functions in all aspects of the conflict cycle, namely early warning, preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation. Today the OSCE is the organization that makes a difference in places where security is threatened or post-conflict activities are present. Bulgarian representatives were a part of the OSCE mission in Kosovo that monitored the 2001 elections. These elections provided another proof of the efficiency of the OSCE in rebuilding conflict-torn societies. Similarly, in the Republic of Macedonia the OSCE, together with partner organizations, plays an important role in supporting the efforts to re-establish peace and stability.

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Bulgaria deems it important to strengthen the OSCE while preserving its existing merits and comparative advantages. The OSCE should retain its unique inclusive, flexible and transparent character as the key pan-European organization for non-military resolution of security issues. It should keep its focus on the politico-military, economic and human dimensions of security. A well-grounded balance between these dimensions is at the very core of the comprehensive nature of the OSCE. As a political organization, the OSCE cherishes inter-state dialogue as the cornerstone of its approach to security. Bulgaria will persevere in strengthening this process of political consultations. Thus, the OSCE can really justify its name of being an organization not only for security but for co-operation as well. Improving transparency is the best means to achieve common political will.

In a similar vein, Bulgaria strongly advocates the improvement of the OSCE management practices. These improvements are essential because

they would entail better spending of taxpayer money, efficient performance and, enhanced political credibility of the Organization. If we strive for better quality of performance of the OSCE, the strengthening of the Secretariat's capacity, both operationally and analytically, is a must. At the same time Bulgaria deems it important to ensure that the OSCE preserves its non-bureaucratic and streamlined character. Generally, whilst reforming the Organization, the OSCE member states should not overwhelm the OSCE with too many rules and regulations. They must aptly balance the introduction of greater organizational capacity with expediency.

This is Bulgaria's reading of all the reform efforts under way since the OSCE Budapest Summit in 1994. Bulgaria took part in the discussions on the Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for 21st century and the Charter on European Security. However, whilst endorsing those documents we made sure that they would not handicap or restrict any potential co-operation with other security organizations. Last but not least, Bulgaria acquiesced to the Model and the Charter, having ensured that their provisions would not substitute, obstruct or delay the processes of NATO and EU enlargement.

BULGARIA'S POSITIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP)

The decisions made since the Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Nice European Councils aim to enable the EU in being a reliable international actor with credible military capabilities. In its capacity as a WEU Associate Partner (since May 1994) and EU negotiating member (since March 2000) Bulgaria favors the development of a credible ESDP in support of the Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). In the process of transfer of the Petersberg tasks from the WEU to the EU Bulgaria deems it important to preserve such positive elements of the WEU *acquis* as the regular dialogue between WEU-member and non-member countries and the Parliamentary dimension of cooperation. Finally, we believe Bulgaria is in a position to contribute to the widening spectrum of ESDP areas of inte-

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However, also being a NATO aspirant, Bulgaria makes explicitly clear that ESDP should not compromise but rather should reinforce the transatlantic link. It is clear for us that ESDP can only be successful on the basis of a robust transatlantic link. We believe that it serves the interests of both Europe and North America if the ESDP passes the “paper tiger” threshold and evolves further. The 1999 Kosovo crisis testified to the importance of building a European capacity to take decisions and to conduct EU-led crisis response operations in situations where NATO as a whole is not engaged.

Furthermore, the ongoing development of an independent European crisis management capacity under the ESDP is a vital ingredient of the global coalition against terrorism. This would help achieve a just and justified burden sharing in ensuring security throughout the Euro-Atlantic space. NATO’s commitment to collective defense notwithstanding, the future EU-led “Petersberg missions” such as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, would help create a stable, peaceful and secure Europe.

A lot of effort should be rendered to fulfil this project. Primarily, it requires tangible national contributions and increased financial commitments. Bulgaria has already pledged a substantial contribution to the EU Headline Goal and offered a contribution to the EU civilian crisis management capabilities. This national contribution, formally offered on April 19, 2001 include a mechanized battalion, an engineer battalion, a chemical detection company, two Mi-17 transport aircraft, and four Mi-24 combat aircraft for search and rescue operations, a guided missile boat and two CIMIC officers. It is important to emphasize that these national assets, declared for participation in future Petersburg missions, are part of Bulgaria’s national contribution for NATO’s non-Article 5 crisis response operations. Bulgaria’s approach ensures the interoperability of these forces with both NATO and EU member states. In addition, this helps ensure a synergy of efforts and opportunities in terms of procedures, doctrines, preparedness and equipment.

It is important to reiterate that the role of the EU applicants within the ESDP formation should not be readily dismissed. On the contrary, Bulgaria believes that the input of all EU candidates should be both reinvigorated and qualitatively modified. Similarly to the Convention on the future of the Union, the ESDP debate could be implemented in such a format to include the EU member states and EU applicants on an equal footing.

Such a forward-looking approach would ensure that Europe will not miss the chance to build a common house together with its future inhabitants. This is a lesson learned from the dialogue with the EU after the first Contributions Commitment Conference in November 2000. We believe that the applicant states should have a greater say in the discussions on the European Rapid Reaction Corps. More specifically, we deem it important to coin an overall mechanism for assessing the declared assets so that the Corps is better managed and used, if need be.

The tragedy of September 11 sent an important “wake-up call” to all democratic nations. We have all been readjusting to the new global security situation. However, it is beyond any doubt that the transatlantic link between Europe and North America should remain as robust as ever. It is now clear that the Euro-Atlantic community is molded not only by common values but common actions as well. In the wake of the two world wars and the Cold War it was American support that helped maintain Europe’s security. Now, in these moments of need, it is Europe that proves a reliable US ally. The 21st century began with a renewed transatlantic partnership.

BULGARIA ON THE WAY TO NATO: LOOKING AHEAD TO PRAGUE

Underpinned by strong political and public consensus, Bulgaria’s membership in NATO is the strategic choice that recognizes no other alternative. Bulgaria decided to apply for NATO membership on February 17, 1997 and has been working towards accession ever since. Foreign policy continuity on Bulgaria’s aspiration for NATO and the EU became the benchmark of Bulgarian politics after the 2001 Parliamentary elections. NATO accession has been a priority of the Government of the United Democratic Forces (1997 – 2001). Following the victory of the National Movement “Simeon II” in the June 2001 elections, the new Government reaffirmed Bulgaria’s commitment to this goal. The government declared that its most immediate task was to gain Bulgaria’s invitation to join NATO at the 2002 Prague Summit. This high degree of political stability is indicative that Bulgaria’s democracy is already mature whilst the adherence to the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty - well-grounded.

For Bulgaria being in NATO entails key strategic and political connotations. Strategically, NATO is an alliance of collective defense to ward off common threats. Politically, NATO is the very embodiment of the demo-

cratic values of the Euro-Atlantic community. Therefore being an Ally stands for upholding common values and fighting common threats. That makes NATO best fitted to deal with the complex character of the security challenges after September 11. Non-military threats such as terrorism and weapons proliferation target simultaneously our strategic interests and way of life. Therefore further NATO enlargement in Prague with qualified aspirant countries from Northern, Central and Southeast Europe is substantiated both in political and strategic terms.

WHY BULGARIA MAKES NATO STRONGER: POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ARGUMENTS

One could think of three major sets of political arguments. Firstly, following the reunification of Germany and the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the Alliance, further NATO enlargement is the next logical and necessary step to dismantle the Yalta divisions of Europe. In the hindsight of today, it appears obvious that the first round of NATO enlargement towards post-communist Central and Eastern Europe was a political decision. In Prague we expect the logical follow-up to the historic symbolism of the 1997 Madrid decision to enlarge NATO with three former Warsaw Pact members. The project of a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe would not be complete until it encompasses Bulgaria and other nations that have been deprived of their free choice 50 years ago at Yalta. This is our reading of the Warsaw speech of US President George W. Bush in June 2001.

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Secondly, NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic did recognize these countries' achievements in the transition to democracy and market economy. Today Bulgaria is a free democratic society with market-oriented economy. This assessment is laid out in the latest Regular Report of the European Commission on Bulgaria's Progress towards the EU. NATO enlargement is the most efficient instrument to consolidate the democracies of post-communist Europe. By acting in Bosnia,

Kosovo and Macedonia NATO has already proved its crisis response capabilities. The time has come now for the Alliance to prove that it could be the leader in institutionalizing the Bulgarian return to the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream of security, political and economic systems. This sends an important message not only to Bulgarian society, but also for all nations on the Balkans, which struggle to consolidate democracy.

Thirdly, another political argument runs to the effect that international terrorism could only be defeated by a coalition, underpinned by a value-based core. Today such a core lynchpin is and could only be NATO. This is exactly the political essence of the wave of solidarity with the US that swept over the democratic world after September 11. Bulgaria, as well as all aspirants, chose to act as *de facto* US and NATO allies. That decision was formally announced at the Vilnius Group summit of all applicants, hosted by Sofia in early October 2001. Such tokens of support entrust the US with an international vote of confidence and important political credit to rely on. Having on board more loyal and reliable Allies like Bulgaria contributes to the success of the global coalition against terrorism.

Beyond political considerations, the strategic arguments to proceed with NATO enlargement are gaining prevalence. This is the best way to come to terms with objective realities. Terrorism has become the new paradigm of international relations. The world was quick to grasp that the global security architecture should be adjusted to the threats of the 21st century, namely international terrorism, extremism, organized crime, arms trafficking, etc. In the face of a global threat such as terrorism there should be a global counter-force capable of operating beyond national borders.

Therefore, decisions to invite new NATO members in 2002 should result from a sound judgement of the capacity of NATO hopefuls to project stability in and around the Euro-Atlantic space. In Prague we all have interest to ensure a robust NATO enlargement with Bulgaria and other qualified aspirants from the south, north and centre of Europe.

In that sense further NATO enlargement is the best means to solve the complex security challenges of today's world. We, who live in Southeast Europe (SEE), could conceive this pretty well. What we know is that a war on terrorism is not simply a war against terrorists. This is a war against the traffic of people, drugs, arms, against corruption and state weakness. Bulgaria is the country in the world that captures one of the largest quantities of drugs on its borders. It has gained a record of most efficiently filtering the heroin flows from Taleban's and Bin Laden's Afghanistan to Europe. This threat has definitely decreased after the success of "Enduring Freedom" but it has not disappeared. Our membership in NATO will undoubtedly boost our efficiency in countering all kinds of illicit trafficking via our territory.

Furthermore, given the political fall-out of Yugoslavia's disintegration, SEE has come to be once again the test case of NATO's post-Cold War endurance and credibility. Because of the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, as well as the recent developments in the Republic of Macedonia, it is exactly in SEE where NATO's new missions of

crisis response and partnership are most relevant. The “Southern dimension” for an enlarged NATO has strategic advantages. To name a few:

- Consolidation of NATO’s southern flank and its extension to the Central European zone;
- The enlargement southwards would facilitate the capacity to project stability to the Eastern Black Sea region, the Caucasus and Central Asia;
- Improved Allied crisis response capacity in the problem areas of greatest importance to the Euro-Atlantic community;
- NATO’s enlargement southwards would ensure the irreversibility of the democratic reforms in the new and revived democracies of Southeast Europe, including Belgrade’s prospects for a “European return”.

In the wake of September 11 the geostrategic value of Bulgaria and the whole region of SEE is increasingly essential. Front-line state during the wars in former Yugoslavia, today Bulgaria is part of the necessary linkage to consolidate NATO’s Southern flank, link the territories of Greece and Turkey with the Central European zone, and project stability to the Central Asian front-line states in the war against international terrorism. This is the essence of the recently launched NATO-targeted “2+2” dialogue between Bulgaria and Romania, Greece and Turkey.

BULGARIA AS A NET PROVIDER OF SECURITY: TANGIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS

Of course, every country has its objective geostrategic potential. But that potential turns into strategic benefits only with strong political will and *de facto* actions. Bulgaria has both. In the course of the crises in the Western Balkans despite bearing the brunt of the economic sanctions against the former Yugoslavia our country did not hesitate to turn its geostrategic potential into assets in favor of NATO.

Alongside efforts to create a common position of the SEE countries *vis-a-vis* the Kosovo crisis, Bulgaria acted as a *de facto* Ally in the course of the NATO-led operations in Kosovo and continue host nation support to the KFOR forces, transiting through Bulgaria. As early as April 1999 Bulgaria granted NATO aircraft and forces participating in Operation “Allied Force” access to its airspace. In June 1999, in accordance with a special agreement with NATO, Bulgaria ensured the transit of NATO forces and equipment for the purposes of Operation “Joint Guardian”. The logistical support for the KFOR forces, crossing Bulgaria’s territory and airspace, is the country’s major contribution to the NATO-

From the very outset of the anti-terrorist campaign Bulgaria has acted as a de facto US and NATO ally and in full compliance with the EU course of action.

led operation in Kosovo. Furthermore, by requesting co-ordination with NATO to grant any air access en route to the Pristina airport Bulgaria played a key role in resolving a situation that was endangering the success of the whole operation and that could have developed into a major conflict. Bulgaria did not waver in its support for NATO even when it took accidental friendly fire on itself during the air strikes against Yugoslavia.

After September 11 Bulgaria stood fast with the US and NATO as well. From the very outset of the anti-terrorist campaign Bulgaria has acted as a *de facto* US and NATO ally and in full compliance with the EU course of action. Bulgaria has granted a blanket permit for the overflight of aircraft taking part in the Operation "Enduring Freedom". Under a bilateral agreement with US, ratified with full unanimity by the National Assembly in November 2001, Bulgaria hosted the first ever US Air Force base on its territory. It has introduced measures to further tighten arms export control, counter drugs trafficking and deter the funding of potential terrorists. Bulgaria has been a participant in the NATO-led SFOR and KFOR from the very beginning. But after September 11 it increased its contribution, thus backfilling NATO positions and helping free NATO assets for other missions. Having deployed its own contingent (security company) to protect the SFOR Headquarters in January 2002, Bulgaria has become the only Partner Country to participate in SFOR with its own, separate contingent. The Bulgarian unit in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was deployed in mid-February 2002. Also, in Tokyo Bulgaria pledged to extend humanitarian assistance and \$1.3 million worth of technical assistance to help rebuild Afghanistan.

In a nutshell, our message to the Allies is clear. We come to NATO willing and capable of rendering an effective military contribution. We come to NATO determined to fill-in rather than widen the capability gap between North America and Europe.

PRIORITY AREAS TO PREPARE FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP

MILITARY REFORM

The message of Bulgaria's credibility and reliability should not be offset by still evolving capacity to contribute military to Art. 5 collective defense. Contrary to other post-communist countries that built their armies from

Under a bilateral agreement with US, ratified with full unanimity by the National Assembly in November 2001, Bulgaria hosted the first ever US Air Force base on its territory.

scratch, Bulgaria had to downsize and restructure its Warsaw Pact-type army. Despite high social costs, over the last three years the Armed Forces were downsized by over 30% whilst their structure aligned with NATO standards. The Bulgarian military units in SFOR and KFOR are fully compatible with NATO and operate with the Allies on an equal footing. The political commitment to complete the military reform is unquestionable, which is best warranted by the Government's decision of assigning over 3.1% of the GDP in real terms to defense spending.

Building upon these major documents such as the Plan 2004 on the Reform of the Armed Forces, the Military Doctrine and the Law on the Defense and the Armed Forces are implemented after being updated. Bulgaria's progress in the area of modernization and NATO-relevant capacity building evolves along multiple projects such as the set-up of Air Sovereignty Operational Center, Field Integrated Communication and Information System, reconstruction of the Graf Ignatievo Air Force base, etc. Another landmark step, though previously delayed many times, is the decision to decommission and destroy the SS-23 missiles by October 2002.

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL REFORMS

Bulgaria's preparations for NATO help accelerate and better target the political and economic reforms under way since 1989. With a view to Prague, Bulgaria is further reinvigorating its policies in fighting corruption, countering organized crime, establishing an efficient judicial system, enhancing the social integration of Roma population, alleviating unemployment, etc. Having come to power with pledges for a "zero tolerance" to corruption, the Government has already started implementing relevant legislation and pressing charges against corrupt officials.

Fighting corruption occupies one of the highest priority items on our agenda. Under the adopted strategy and action Plan on Countering Corruption a panoply of measures is envisaged and will be implemented. These include legislative measures such as the entry into force of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption by July 2002, the enactment of a law amending the Law on Judiciary by October 2002, the adoption of amendments to the Penal Code, incriminating various forms of corruption and introducing more severe punishments for bribery by October-November 2002. As a corollary, a number of administrative measures are planned, such as, for example, the establishment of a Public Training center for Magistrates.

Two areas for further action are particularly high on Bulgaria's reform agenda. The first refers to the enhancement of border control, so that trafficking in people, drugs and arms is cut off more efficiently. A new

Border Protection Law is to be passed by the end of 2002, aiming to further boost our efficiency in countering all kinds of illicit trafficking. Another particular priority area extends to export control. Bulgaria's export control policy is fully commensurate with the existing international supply-side mechanisms whilst sanctions and restrictions are strictly observed. Furthermore, by May-June 2002 we will have a new law amending and complementing the existing legal framework, so that controls are up to the highest standards. In the legal realm, one recent development is the adoption of the Law on the Protection of the Classified Information, so that the security of information is best kept. Building on that, further progress in the establishment of INFOSEC will follow shortly.

CO-OPERATIVE INSTRUMENTS IN ALLY-PARTNER FORMAT

It is worth reiterating that many of the achievements reached in the course of the military reform were spurred by Bulgaria's participation in the Ally/Partner co-operative processes such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Membership Action Plan (MAP). A founding member of the EAPC (that replaced the North Atlantic Co-operation Council in 1997) Bulgaria views the Council as an extremely useful framework for political co-operation among Allies and Partners, endowed with unique merits in strengthening Europe's security and stability. Bulgaria joined the PfP on February 14, 1994. Its PfP policy includes a multiple of activities, primarily practical exercises, to make the Bulgarian Armed Forces fully interoperable with those of NATO member states.

The introduction and application of NATO standards for armed forces structure and organization is basically done through guidance received under PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). PARP is a major learning vehicle to promote transparency in defense planning between Allies and Partners, much as the Defense Planning Questionnaire does among NATO members. The expanded and adapted PARP cycle for 2000 – 2006 aims at ensuring further synchronicity with NATO defense planning requirements. Having recognized this, Bulgaria has been implementing a package of 82 Partnership Goals (PGs), of which 47 are MAP-related.

Since its announcement at the 1999 Washington Summit, Bulgaria has been making full use of the MAP as an instrument to better manage and streamline the national preparations for NATO. The feedback received from NATO regarding our MAP implementation is rewarding. Bulgaria reads those assessments as a "user-friendly" and substantial vehicle to help us plug-in NATO capability immediately upon accession. Judging from the Alliance's latest findings, presented at the NATO-Bulgaria (19+1) meet-

ing on April 23, 2002, Bulgaria has made significant progress in meeting NATO membership requirements. As an invitation for Bulgaria in Prague would only be an opening of a new phase of preparations, Bulgaria is determined to continue its efforts through a fourth MAP cycle and all other relevant instruments. We should recall, however, that decisions on further enlargement are substantiated politically and geostrategically. In that sense assessments gained through the MAP lend support to the forthcoming political decisions in Prague.

CONCLUSIONS

In the words of NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson, “today geography is not security”. By extension, one might say that policy makers are fettered by history but they can also make history. Today there exists a historic opportunity to safeguard stability and security in Europe on the premises of inclusiveness and integration. Bulgaria and the whole region of Southeast Europe are too vital to be left aside. Bulgaria has always been an integral part of the European civilization. Now it is bound to be an integral part of the modern European institutions as well. By joining NATO Bulgaria would strengthen the Alliance’s military capabilities and ensure a strategic depth to better counter terrorism and other non-military threats after September 11. Furthermore, Bulgaria would also grant a valuable input in the new European spirit – the spirit of a unified Europe.

A PARTNER IN TACKLING THE EMERGING THREATS

Even a cursory examination of current non-military threats to security reveals the salience of the international dimension in any effort to tackle them. It has become commonplace to stipulate the linkage between international organized crime and security threats. Yet, it should be noted that such a perception is a relatively recent phenomenon. The major concern is that the expansion of the law enforcement effort and its relation to security might be to the detriment of civil rights protection. While it is crucial to continually strengthen the protection of civil rights, it is clear that the emerging threats to security cannot be tackled unless full use is made of the whole range of law enforcement capacities. These are the underpinnings of the policy approach of successive Bulgarian governments since the mid-1990s.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION – POLICY AND STRUCTURES

As has been shown in a previous chapter of this volume, the adoption of the National Security Concept and the Strategy for Combating Crime develop this new, wider notion of security and seek to implement it. As a matter of principle, these documents define international cooperation as the essential tool for the achievement of effective law enforcement. Both documents stress the need to strengthen the administrative capacity of the state agencies – such as the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Prosecutor’s Office and the Investigative Service – and particularly their international cooperation units. The goals of EU and Euro-Atlantic integration additionally presuppose the compatibility of Bulgarian legislation with EU law and UN conventions in a number of areas.

The efforts to ensure Bulgarian law’s compatibility with EU legislation and legal practice have been at the center of public policy. Bulgaria’s progress in this area has allowed the opening of the chapter on “Justice and Home Affairs” in the negotiations with the European Union. Over ten

areas of cooperation required legislative measures on Bulgaria's part to allow effective international cooperation. One such area was the fight against terrorism. Bulgaria has ratified all major UN Conventions in the fight against terrorism with the exception of the 1997 Convention on Terrorist Bombings and the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism. Even these two conventions are on the agenda for ratification in the coming year or so. Bulgaria has adopted almost all of the EU laws on visa and migration policy and on police cooperation. The country has adopted the EU legal definition of organized crime; the Bulgarian Penal Code criminalizes the whole range of criminal activities covered by EU legislation. The extent of legislative harmonization is enormous and hardly needs to be reproduced here. The import matter is that Bulgaria hopes to close this negotiation chapter by 2003, thereby adopting and implementing the entire range of EU law on organized crime, migration, combating of drug trafficking, terrorism and money-laundering.

In terms of administration, all services of the Ministry of Interior have international cooperation units that function as immediate points of entry for operational international cooperation. The Bulgarian Police Academy has introduced a special course in the curriculum to train future police officers in the legal and operational intricacies of international cooperation. Since 1998, numerous officers have received extensive training at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary. The US government supports the Academy, and training is provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The police academies of EU member states have also provided a great deal of training. The support received from German Border Police Guard and its facilities was most notable. The year 2000 saw the emergence of the European Police College. Bulgaria will sign an agreement with the College for a special, long-term training program, ensuring the continued transfer of expertise and experience. The Ministry of Justice has a judicial cooperation office, which handles all requests for international cooperation. As part of the accession process to the EU and as EU law evolves, it will be possible in the coming years to file requests for judicial cooperation directly with the courts and not through the Ministry of Interior. A Magistrates' Training Center was founded in 1999 with the support of the US Bar Association. Foreign language training is provided by the Center, as are courses dealing with international cooperation.

The instrument of twinning is also particularly useful in ensuring effective international cooperation. Twinning entails the long-term secondment of experienced law enforcement officers from member states of the EU to Bulgarian state institutions. Such twinning arrangements are currently underway in the Ministries of Justice and Interior as well as the Prosecutor's

Office. The scope of their task varies, but it always includes the enhancement of cooperation capacities. These might include legal measures to improve the legal basis, international cooperation techniques, language training, curriculum development, elaboration of specific training programs, or management techniques.

The central administrations of the Ministries of Justice and the Interior have also undergone tremendous change. With the adoption of the public administration laws, the entire career structure was overhauled and specific requirements in terms of level of education, foreign languages, and level of experience were introduced in the legislation. A whole new generation of young university graduates has entered the civil service after passing the mandatory entrance exams, thereby ensuring adequate implementation of the strategic priorities of European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

BUREAU FOR FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE

The Bureau for Financial Intelligence was established in 1998 in response to a new challenge. This bureau is an administrative structure set up within the Ministry of Finance by virtue of the 1998 Act on Measures against Money Laundering. Its legal status was subsequently upgraded to that of an independent administrative agency. The primary task of the Agency for Financial Intelligence is to collect and analyze reports of suspicious transactions. It then has the right to ask law-enforcement agencies to initiate investigations into these transactions. The Agency is to receive further financial support from the EU in the coming years. Its main emphasis will be on the capacity to exchange information with foreign partners. As part of the response to newly emerging threats in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, it is most likely that the Agency will be granted the leeway to conduct its own investigations.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH INSTITUTIONS AND STATES

Cooperation might be divided in two equally important categories: cooperation with international institutions and bilateral cooperation with states.

COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

COOPERATION WITH EUROPOL

Bulgaria's contacts with Europol date back to the mid-1990s, when Europol was still known as the European Drugs Unit. Yet, due to its

limited mandate, cooperation was reduced to occasional exchanges of views. The year 1999 saw the emergence of Europol proper with a much expanded mandate, but with limited possibilities for operational cooperation. Bulgarian law enforcement agencies have been host to a number of experts from Europol, including a visit by its director. During the period 1999 – 2001, Bulgaria has provided Europol with annual organized crime situation reports. These have been incorporated in the EU Organized Crime Report, which is drafted on an annual basis. In April 2000, Bulgaria began its negotiations with Europol for the adoption of a Cooperation Agreement that will allow the exchange of operational information in ongoing investigations. Such an agreement will allow an exchange of personal data, which should facilitate investigations into organized crime. The negotiations are to be concluded in the year 2002 with the establishment of a Bulgarian Europol Contact Point, which will include representatives of all law enforcement agencies. Bulgarian liaison officers are to be seconded, upon completion of the negotiations, to the headquarters of Europol in The Hague, Netherlands.

COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

This area of international cooperation expanded enormously in the latter part of the 1990s, as Bulgaria advanced toward and began negotiations for accession to the EU in December 1999. Activities include the active exchange of information with the Council of the EU on illegal migration, organized crime, and asylum seekers on the territory of the country. Some of these exchanges of statistics and analyses take place on a monthly basis. The cooperation and dialogue with Europol, which has already been mentioned, can only be expected to become more intense. In the context of the accession negotiations, Bulgaria provides comprehensive information on institutional and legal developments, detailed analyses of the organized crime situation, and other information on a regular basis.

Border control is another important area of cooperation. The central assumption of Bulgarian policy on this issue is that effective border control is essential in tackling organized crime and its major manifestations: trafficking of drugs and human beings, and fraud. Effective border control plays a role in the prevention of terrorism, as well. The main efforts over the past few years have focused on the complete overhaul of the former communist regime's military border guard and its transformation into a modern, well-trained border police organization. The year 1997 saw the adoption of a five-year strategy to complete that task. The strategy has been enhanced a number of times with the assistance of EU experts and it should be completed towards the end of 2002. Bulgaria is devoting significant funds to the establishment

of its own integrated information system, which will become an element of the Schengen Information System in due course.

COOPERATION WITH INTERPOL

Bulgaria joined the international police organization Interpol in 1989. Since then, numerous measures have been implemented to establish a reliable and efficient contact point for operational cooperation. The culmination of these efforts occurred in June 1998, when the Bulgarian Interpol Bureau was recognized along with eleven other European Bureaus (out of a total of 45 European Bureaus) for its full compliance with the 17 minimum standards for effective international cooperation. These standards include a 24-hour online link, staffed by trained personnel, presence of liaison officers, a system for the classification of messages, and use of all major European languages. In addition to its routine work, Interpol has assisted Bulgaria in its efforts to combat the trafficking of stolen vehicles and car insurance fraud. As a result, Bulgaria has hosted, jointly with Interpol, a series of international conferences dealing with these matters since 1998.

These are only some of the activities in which Bulgarian law enforcement agencies have been cooperating with international and European structures. The entire spectrum is too broad to address thoroughly in one short chapter. Nevertheless, mention needs to be made of the on-going cooperation of Bulgarian law enforcement agencies with the International Organization of Migration and the International Center for Migration Policy Development, with whom the Ministry of Interior has signed and is implementing cooperation agreements. Among the UN agencies, Bulgaria is enjoying particularly useful contacts with the UNDCP.

COOPERATION WITH STATES

COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES

Cooperation with the US intensified significantly in the latter part of the 1990s. This process has as its basis the joint Working Plan signed in 1998 by then US President Bill Clinton and then-Bulgarian President, Mr. Petar Stoyanov. The plan led to the establishment of three working groups: on economic issues, on military issues, and on law enforcement issues. Work has been focused on the improvement of operational cooperation with the national services of the Ministry of Interior (especially the National Service for Combating Organized Crime in the area of drug trafficking and the National Security Service in the area of terrorism), America's assistance in the drafting of Bulgarian legislation, and the general enhancement of Bulgaria's public administration.

In 1998-1999, the US Bar Association participated in the implementation of Training Program for judges, investigators and police officers. Former and current employees of the US Justice Department have assisted the Bulgarian authorities in drafting legislation in the following areas: money-laundering, corruption, economic crime, and fraud. American assistance was instrumental in the establishment of the Bulgarian Anti-Money Laundering Agency at the Ministry of Finance in 1998.

Bulgaria participated in the US program on countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This program entailed technical and institutional assistance to the Bulgarian border control authorities in order to prevent the trafficking of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. A US official was seconded to Bulgaria for a 5-month period in 1998.

US assistance has been especially useful in the area of combating illegal trafficking of human beings – the most profitable form of organized crime at the present. Bulgarian authorities welcomed the posting of a liaison officer from the US Justice Department to the US Embassy in Sofia, and judicial cooperation has improved as a result. For a number of years, the employees of the US Drug Enforcement Agency stationed in Athens, Greece, have enjoyed very active operational cooperation with their counterparts in the Service for Combating Organized Crime at the Ministry of Interior.

Numerous visits between high-ranking officials have taken place since 1998. In October 1998, a Bulgarian delegation led by the Minister of Interior made an official visit to the US and held meetings with the then Attorney General Janet Reno, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Louis Freeh, the Mayor of New York, and others. More recently, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency visited Bulgaria in August 2000, while the director of the FBI paid a visit to Sofia in the month of March 2001.

COOPERATION WITH EU MEMBER STATES

A complete account of the whole range of cooperation activities with the member states of the EU is beyond the scope of this volume. The policy approach of successive Bulgarian governments has been to seek cooperation with member states in the areas where these countries have potentially significant contributions to make. In this vein, Bulgaria has concluded a series of bilateral law enforcement cooperation agreements with each of the EU states, thus providing sufficient legal grounds for operational cooperation. Such agreements have been signed with Greece, Austria, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Italy, to name a few. Bulgaria has also signed police cooperation agreements with Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania.

Bulgaria has a relationship of long-standing cooperation with the United

Kingdom. Community policing, police management matters, combating of drug trafficking and language training are some of the areas of intensive cooperation. Since 1999, a seconded British expert has been advising the Bulgarian Minister of Interior on strengthening institutional capacity, EU integration and public relations. The British Know-How Fund is implementing a number of projects around the country, focusing on the integration of minorities in the work force and community policing strategies. Cooperation with Germany has also been extensive. Activities have included the secondment of a liaison officer of the German Border Guard to the German Embassy in Sofia, significant technical and expert assistance in the area of border control, financial support for the establishment of a DNA system in Bulgaria, and long-term secondments of German experts on management matters at the Bulgarian Border Police and the Border Police Training Center in Pazardzhik. Bulgarian authorities also cooperate with France in the areas of management strategies, management of institutional change, language training, cooperation in combating trafficking of stolen vehicles, etc. Spain is assisting Bulgaria in the establishment and maintenance of the Bulgarian Schengen Information System. Cooperation with Belgium has been particularly intensive in the area of illegal migration. Bulgaria is interested in pursuing cooperation with the Netherlands in order to learn from the experience of the Amsterdam police force.

As mentioned above, this brief summary of cooperation activities is only a glimpse at what is quickly becoming a web of daily contacts and interaction with the member states of the EU.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

Effective security cooperation may be likened to a puzzle. A complete picture is impossible if any of the pieces are missing. Similarly, no state will ever manage to tackle security matters without a complete and effective framework for cooperation with all its neighboring countries. Based on this premise, the Bulgarian government initiated a series of multi-lateral cooperation measures. These include the Agreement between Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey on the fight against terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in human beings and arms, and other serious crime, signed on April 16, 1998. This agreement established a High Commission of experts from the three states to facilitate cooperation. In a similar vein, the Bulgarian, Romanian and Greek Ministers of Interior signed a Protocol on enhanced cooperation in the fight against trans-border crime in September 1998. The Protocol, like the Agreement

with Romania and Turkey, establishes a Joint Commission for operational cooperation. Presently, much effort is being made to prepare a cooperation agreement with the FR Yugoslavia.

Bulgaria cooperates with its neighboring states on the basis on agreements of varying scope. One concrete example of the range of bilateral cooperation activities is border control cooperation with Turkey. The legal basis for this cooperation is the Agreement between the governments of Bulgaria and Turkey for the prevention and settlement of border incidents. In addition, the two countries have an Agreement on coast guard cooperation, which includes exchange of operational information. These Agreements entail Joint Area and District Border Commissions, which meet on a regular basis. These ensure cooperation at the level of units protecting the actual borders of the two countries. Additionally, there is a Bulgarian-Turkish Border Commission, which handles matters of operational cooperation.

Bulgaria has established a particularly vibrant cooperation relationship with the Republic of Macedonia. Two intergovernmental agreements were signed in May 2000 – one dealing with the prevention and resolution of border incidents, and a second dealing with the protection and maintenance of the borders. A Protocol for cooperation in the area of combating illegal migration was also signed in June 2000. There are regular meetings between the Ministers of Interior of the two states. Bulgaria is also providing expert assistance in the area of border police reform.

SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN COOPERATION INITIATIVE (SECI)

SECI was developed over the years 1997 – 1998 and sought, among other things, to facilitate trade in Southeast Europe by making passage across borders easier. Despite the mainly economic nature of early American involvement in Bulgarian development, the US government turned its attention to law enforcement matters with the introduction of this Initiative. The Regional Center for Combating Organized Crime, based in Bucharest, Romania, was established after the signing of the Agreement on Cooperation and Prevention of Trans-border Crime in 1998. The Bulgarian Parliament ratified the agreement in the year 2000 and the Ministry of Interior seconded a liaison officer to the Center. The Center seeks to facilitate the exchange of operational organization on a regional scale and manages a number of task forces on the trafficking of women and children, on drug trafficking, on customs fraud, and on stolen vehicles. Bulgaria chairs the task force on drug trafficking. In the context of the Center's work, Bulgaria has insisted that special attention be paid to the passage of adequate personal data protection laws in the participating states. Such legislation would allow more adequate operational cooperation between the countries of the region.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN KEY AREAS

A number of areas have received particular attention in the cooperation efforts of the Bulgarian authorities. Three of these – border control, trafficking of human beings and drug trafficking – deserve special mention.

BORDER CONTROL

The importance of effective border control has already been underlined in a previous paragraph. In addition to the work of the Border Police, an Interdepartmental Committee on Border Control at the Council of Ministers brings together all state agencies performing functions at the borders – customs, veterinary, phyto-sanitary control, etc. Yet, the major tasks remain the fulfillment of the EU-Schengen criteria and Bulgaria's preparation for its role on the future external border of the EU.

Since 1998, the German Border Guard has been a most active partner in providing technical and expert assistance. The official and working visits of Bulgarian and German police officers in both countries have been numerous and productive. For over two years, the German border control authorities have had a liaison officer at the German embassy in Sofia ensuring direct, operational cooperation with his Bulgarian counterparts. Under the PHARE Program of the EU, over 10 million Euros will be invested in the strengthening of border control over the coming years. This will entail further administrative capacity support for the Border Police and technical assistance for effective border surveillance. The Federal Republic of Germany has also made two long-term secondments of experienced border control officers. One is stationed at the headquarters of the Border Police advising on management and policy matters. The other officer is stationed at the newly established Border Police Training College in the city of Pazardzhik. The college was established over two years ago and provides comprehensive specialized training for border police officers. Assistance is also expected from the European Police College in the years prior to EU accession. A possible outcome of the debate on the modes of protection of the EU external borders might entail the creation of a single, common EU police force for border control. In October 2001, Bulgaria organized a series of joint border patrols with border police officers of EU member states.

TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS

The issue of trafficking in people is of common concern to both the United States and the European Union. The US and the EU adopted a new Transatlantic Agenda in 1998, and the Agenda clearly identified trafficking as an issue of major concern where joint efforts are required. In

implementing the Agenda, the EU teamed with Hungary and the US teamed with Bulgaria in order to organize information campaigns for women who might be targets of traffickers. The Bulgarian law enforcement authorities had by then already signed cooperation agreements with the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and “Animus Foundation,” an affiliate of the La Strada Foundation, both of which are involved in work with women who might be targets and women who have already been victims of traffickers. An extensive information campaign was then carried out in 1999 through TV and radio ads, sociological surveys, meetings with young women, distributions of leaflets at music clubs, schools, passport offices, airports, and other key places. The modes of cooperation established during the implementation of the information campaigns have been further developed. A series of roundtable discussions on trafficking have been held with the active input of the IOM and various non-governmental organizations. There is ongoing cooperation between NGOs and the Consular Directorate of the Bulgarian Foreign Affairs Ministry for the re-integration of women who have been victims of trafficking. The Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior is involved in a number of projects with the local office of the IOM in Sofia. The National Border Police have had a special unit dealing with the trafficking of human beings since its establishment. The latest effort in this field involved assistance from the FBI. A permanent Working Group on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings was established in 2001. The group includes representatives from all institutions with prerogatives in this area and seeks to facilitate operational cooperation. Its work is led by the National Service for Combating Organized Crime.

DRUG TRAFFICKING

Over the past several years it has become more and more obvious that Bulgaria is located on the so-called “Balkan route” of drug trafficking. The Bulgarian government and its institutions have begun strengthening their previously existing structures and establishing new agencies to respond to this problem. The existing National Service for Combating Organized Crime has been strengthened through the expansion of the employee base and through active operational cooperation and exchange. Effective cooperation with the Athens-based officers of the US Drug Enforcement Agency and with the liaison officer of United Kingdom’s Excise and Duty Office, which has prerogatives in the area of combating drugs, has been crucial. Bulgaria’s numerous contacts with Europol officials have also made a contribution to the enhancement of the capacity of the service. The National Drug Intelligence Center was established in late 1999 to gather, process and analyze incoming intelligence information on drug-related crimes. The

Center is supported by Interpol and by the PHARE / UN Drug Enforcement Program. The Customs Agency has also benefited from its active cooperation with the UK and France. The EU has provided funding for drug detection equipment. Bilateral assistance has also played a role in Bulgaria's success at combating drug trafficking.

On the demand side, a National Council on Narcotic Drugs has been created within the Council of Ministers. This Council is presently drafting a strategy on combating drugs, which will encompass both the supply and demand side of the issue. The Council will also function as a contact point with the EU Drug Monitoring Center based in Lisbon, Portugal. There also functions an Interdepartmental Precursor Control Commission, whose primary task is to exercise control over the production, procession and use of precursors.

CONCLUSION

It is notoriously difficult to completely list the entire spectrum of legal and cultural transformations in the area of non-military security and law enforcement. To attempt to quantify the impact of these phenomena would be impossible. Thus, it would be futile to simply cite figures. It is also next to impossible to quantify the Bulgarian contribution to the effort to combat and contain international crime. It is abundantly clear, however, that Bulgaria already possesses a consolidated framework of law enforcement institutions with well-elaborated structures and legal foundations. The adoption of EU law is introducing a series of novel legal instruments to combat organized crime. Moreover, there are a number of areas in which legal assistance from countries such as the US has made a significant difference. Bulgaria has undeniably made significant contributions toward the suppression of drug trafficking and illegal migration through the region. The state has also managed to foil any attempts by terrorist groups to use Bulgarian territory for their bases of activity. There have not been significant attempts to use Bulgarian institutions for money laundering.

Regardless of these achievements, many challenges remain. Recently adopted legal norms still need to be implemented more effectively. More investments must be made in equipment and training of personnel. Yet, there can be little doubt that through its contribution and its constant cooperation with European and Euro-Atlantic partners, Bulgaria will continue to be a strong link in the effort to ensure international security.

ANTI-TERRORIST POLICY

In accordance with its foreign policy and economic orientation and as a responsible member of the global community (and currently also as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council) the Republic of Bulgaria has not only unconditionally condemned the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 in the United States but also immediately took measures at all levels for increasing its own effectiveness at countering terrorism.

In the 20th century, terrorism has occasionally presented a security problem to Bulgaria for relatively short periods at a time. The territory of the country has not been used as a basis for the preparation of terrorist acts against other countries. According to the media, persons involved in terrorist activities have only passed through Bulgaria or stayed there for a short time. In some cases, despite the differences between the two blocs, Bulgaria has provided assistance to the special services of NATO member countries for the detention of suspects located in Bulgaria. In this sense, Bulgaria has experience at countering terrorism, but at the individual level and in cooperation with other countries. While terrorism was usually fought on a bilateral basis during the 20th century, at the beginning of the 21st century multilateral international cooperation has become a priority.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION

In accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 105, Paragraph 2, the Bulgarian government implements the country's national security policy. The National Assembly adopts laws and, through its specialized commissions, exercises control over the activities of the Government. The President of the Republic of Bulgaria is the supreme commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and chairs Consultative Council on National Security. Certain members of the Government and representatives of all parties in the Parliament also participate in this Council.

The Security Council assists the government with its activities in the field of the National Security. The country's special services with competencies at

a national level are represented in the Council. The materials for the sessions of this Council are prepared by a dedicated analysis division, often with the participation of officers from the intelligence and counter-intelligence services. The Council's importance and the effectiveness of its operation are manifested particularly strongly with regard to the information support it provides to the Government policy under crisis conditions.

Therefore, at a top political level, conditions and prerequisites have been created in the Republic of Bulgaria for organizing and pursuing a policy of the national security, including the fight against terrorism.

In the past ten years, the legal and regulatory framework for the operation of special and police forces and other enforcement authorities has been established and developed. Part of their authority includes combating events and activities, which might be related to terrorism. In this country there is no specific anti-terrorist legislation, but activities that constitute forms or preparation of terrorist actions are deemed a criminal offense. Related texts exist in the Penal Code, Art. 96, Art. 97, Art. 97a, Art. 106, Art. 107 and the respective sections of the Measures against Money Laundering Act. The Ministry of Interior Act stipulates that one of the basic tasks of the National Security Service is to counter international terrorism and extremism (Art. 46, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 10) and the use of force or use of means jeopardizing the general public with a political purpose (Art. 46, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 4), which is in effect a terrorist activity. The National Service for Combating Organized Crime also has competencies for countering terrorism. According to some experts, this creates conditions for lack of coordination and low efficiency of counteraction against terrorism. A careful reading and analysis of the respective texts of the Ministry of Interior Act and the Regulation on its Enforcement prompts the conclusion that the National Security Service (NSS) has the competencies of an information and analytical structure, while the National Service for Combating Organized Crime carries out operating and investigation activities. On the other hand, the NSS counters international terrorism and extremism, and the National Service for Combating the Organized Crime counters "terrorist activities," i.e. specific terrorist acts. In this sense, the difference between terrorism as a general phenomenon and its manifestations in terrorist acts was identified and established in Bulgaria as early as 1997 and 1998. This distinction was adopted in the end of 2001 by the European Union as well.

The Specialized Task Force for Fighting Terrorism (STFFT) and also the Specialized Service for Combating Terrorist Activities, for Protection of Strategic and Particularly Important Sites and for Prevention and Detection of Serious Crimes are within the Ministry of Interior. STFFT is the structural unit, implementing the immediate counteraction of terrorist acts. The spe-

cifics of STFFT and its operations in crisis situations have given grounds to the Bulgarian legislator to explicitly stipulate that, “Use of the Special Task Force shall be permitted by a written order of the Minister of Interior on case by case basis” (The Ministry of Interior Act, Article 157, paragraph 2). Therefore, the intelligence, analytical, detective and combat activities concerning the countering of terrorism in the Republic of Bulgaria are concentrated in the Ministry of Interior. This is an essential condition for the unified management of forces and resources and for preventing any disorganization in the fight against terrorism. The Bulgarian Army also has antiterrorist structures, but they are trained mostly for support actions.

The basic concept documents for organizing and pursuing the national security policy include the National Security Concept (NSC) adopted by a Resolution of the 38th National Assembly and promulgated in the State Gazette, issue 46 of April 22, 1998, and the Military Doctrine (MD) of the Republic of Bulgaria adopted by a Resolution of the National Assembly on April 8, 1999 and promulgated in the State Gazette of April 13, 1999. In the above documents, international terrorism has been mentioned directly only as risk for national security. The abrupt change in the activities of international terrorist organizations has made it necessary to start working on the formulation of new strategies and amendments to the current national security policy documents. These changes are important both from the point of view of immediate risks and threats against our country and from the point of view of Bulgaria’s increasing commitments to international security. In this context, work has started on the adoption of a special law on the fight against terrorism. The concept for this law’s development is based on the understanding that it should provide a legal definition of terrorism and should regulate the activities of the individual authorities (intelligence, police, control, investigation, and judicial authorities) with no need of establishing an independent structural unit. Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001) of the UN Security Council and the EU mandatory measures and definitions in relation to the fight against terrorism, which were approved in the end of 2001, are the basis of the legislative, organizational and management activities for establishing the regulatory and institutional basis for fighting terrorism.

POLICY

Currently, the main task of the competent Bulgarian institutions is to limit the possibilities for financing or any other support of the activities of inter-

national terrorist organizations. In addition to reviewing and updating the regulatory framework, specific measures have been taken as follows:

- The list of terrorist organizations that could possibly use the territory of this country, as well as the list of legal persons and organizations registered under the Bulgarian laws, have been verified and supplemented.
- The Measures against Money Laundering Act provides an expanded list of persons obligated to identify their clients and to report to the Agency of the Financial Intelligence Bureau any suspicious operations and transactions. This list already includes the Bulgarian National Bank, the Customs Administration, the Central Depository, sports organizations, pension funds, and dealers selling automobiles in the line of business. A lower threshold for identification of clients in case of exchange of foreign currency was set. The right of the Agency of Financial Intelligence Bureau to out-of-court access to bank and commercial classified information, particularly in the cases where inquiries were received from foreign financial intelligence authorities has been exactly regulated.
- Provisions have been made for the “freezing” of the financial assets of persons engaged in or trying to engage or assist in terrorist acts, as well as those of firms and corporations owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and structures, acting on behalf of such persons and structures, or under their instructions, including financial resources derived or created through property held or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons or persons or structures related to them. The provisions of Article 185 – Obligations for Taking Measures to Prevent Crimes – of the Penal Procedure Code states that, “the prosecutor and the investigator are obliged to take the necessary measures for preventing crime (including a terrorist act), for which there are grounds to infer that will be perpetrated, including temporary seizure of the instruments with which the crime could be perpetrated.”

The Measures against Money Laundering Act, passed in 1998, provides for the possibility for the Minister of Finance, on a motion by the Director of the Financial Intelligence Bureau, to suspend by a written order any particular operation or transaction for a period up to three working days, for which the Prosecutor’s Office should be notified (Art. 12). The Prosecutor may impose a preventive measure or petition the respective court to impose an injunction or restraint. The court is to come up with a

decision on the petition within 24 hours. The new situation after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 necessitates reviewing of the existing legal framework. The development of a new system of measures is planned, including amendments and supplements to current preventive legislation like the law mentioned above or the adoption of a new law.

A particular example of measures pursued to freeze accounts and assets in banks and financial institutions is seen in Decree No 39 on the Fulfillment of Resolution 1267 (1999) of the Security Council adopted by the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria on March 27, 2000, which provides for the “freezing” of financial resources held or controlled by the Taliban Group.

A special Decree of the Council of Ministers was adopted on December 12, 2001 regarding the enforcement of Resolution 1373 (2001) for freezing, according to a specific procedure, the bank accounts and other financial assets or economic resources of physical and legal persons who perform, or are trying to perform or to assist in the performance of terrorist acts. This Decree also provides for freezing the financial resources of third parties, when they were obtained or resulting from property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by physical or legal persons who perform, try to perform, or assist in the performance of terrorist acts.

On December 10, 2001 the Council of Ministers adopted Decision No 804 on the Ratification of the Convention on Suppression of Financing Terrorism. With a view to the Convention’s effective enforcement after its ratification, amendments to the Penal Code and to other domestic legislation are to be passed, new legislation is to be adopted. These measures will bring Bulgaria’s legislation into compliance with the provisions of Articles 4, 5, 8, and 18 of the Convention. These are pending changes in the Bulgarian legislation, and will reflect the latest recommendations made at the session of FATF held on October 31, 2001 as the Republic of Bulgaria will soon accede to it.

The forthcoming amendments and supplements to the Penal Code will contain a special text on terrorism to incriminate the collection or provision, in any way whatsoever, of funds for perpetration of a terrorist act or in the knowledge that they will be used for that purpose, and to stipulate the confiscation of funds subject to that act. Amendments and supplements to the Penal Code are also under preparation to introduce penalizing the preparations for commitment of the following crimes, which may constitute terrorist acts: Article 142 and 142a (kidnapping and unlawful deprivation of liberty); Article 337 (illegal manufacture, trade, transportation, importing or exporting of explosives, firearms or ammunition); Article

356f and Article 356h, paragraph 2 (some crimes related to the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes).

A draft of special penal provisions for terrorism and financing of terrorism, also stipulates the confiscation of the funds for financing of terrorist acts (draft version of a new Article 108a of the Penal Code). There have also been proposals for the penalization of the acts that constitute preparations for commitment of crimes that may be considered terrorist acts (kidnapping and unlawful deprivation of liberty; illegal manufacture, trade, transportation, importing or exporting of explosives, firearms or ammunition; and some crimes related to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes). Following the mandatory procedures of forwarding and consideration, the National Assembly will pass these laws.

In relation to the direct organization, preparation, supply and armament of terrorism, Bulgarian legislation unequivocally defines as criminal the provision of any form of aid, active or passive, to structures or persons involved in terrorist acts, the recruitment of members of terrorist groups and the supplying of arms to terrorists

Recruitment members of terrorist groups and supplying arms to terrorists are punishable as preparation for or aiding of a respective terrorist act. Moreover, illegally supplying arms may be punished separately as a generally dangerous crime (Art. 337 and Art. 339 of the Penal Code) or as aggravated smuggling (Art. 242). In addition to that, the special Decree of the Council of Ministers adopted on November 29, 2001 concerning the enforcement of Resolution 1373 (2001) explicitly prohibits the recruitment, in any way whatsoever, of members of terrorist groups, by Bulgarian natural or legal persons or persons temporarily in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, as well as the sale, supply or transfer by Bulgarian natural or legal persons or persons temporarily in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria of any kinds of armament and related equipment to natural or legal persons involved in the preparation or commission of terrorist acts.

The competent Bulgarian institutions directly engaged in the efforts to combat crime and with a view to actively countering terrorism in the context of Resolution 1373, have worked out and now implement the Plan for Detecting and Preventing Terrorist Activities on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria. As a follow-up to this Plan, additional measures have also been undertaken. These are aimed at:

1. Establishing a strict regime and control over generally hazardous substances by extending the requirements to persons who apply for and hold firearms or handle explosives and other generally hazardous substances and enhancing the control over them.

2. Actively countering crimes related to the use of explosives through operative measures.
3. Carrying out complex security investigations at sites where explosives, strong poisons, and radioactive and other generally hazardous substances are kept.

The government will soon submit to the National Assembly a draft-law to amend and supplement the Foreign Trade in Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies Act (1996) for the purpose of strengthening the national mechanisms in that field. The proposed changes are targeted at improving the administration of licensing and permit regimes as well as the effective implementation of the respective international commitments of this country. Control over intangible transfers of technologies is improving, as is control over intermediary activities related to foreign trade in arms and dual-use goods and technologies. This has been achieved through the introduction of a regime of registration and licensing for companies engaged in intermediary activities.

Of special significance to Bulgaria's security is the protection of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant against any unsanctioned encroachment on the nuclear material during the time of its exploitation, safekeeping and transportation, as well as against other forms of sabotage of the nuclear installations and material. To that end, a physical protection concept has been developed on the basis of the threat to the Nuclear Power Plant as defined by the National Security Service and the category of the nuclear material. The System of Physical Safeguarding of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant has been organized on the basis of the requirements of Regulation No 6/06.08.1993 and 1MPC1KC/225/P/EY4 of IAEA and provides for administrative and technical measures.

Specific measures have been worked out with a view to preventing the commission of terrorist acts. These include measures for the provision of early warnings to other states through the exchange of information by the competent bodies of Ministries and institutions related to this process. Within the system of the Ministry of Interior, a rapid-reaction operating unit has been established to respond to signals for threats of terrorist acts.

The interaction among the competent services of the Ministry of Interior has been improved with a view to acquiring information on the preparations and commission of terrorist acts against particularly important targets, including diplomatic missions. The Ministry of Interior and licensed security companies provide security of these particularly important sites.

The exchange of information with similar units from NATO member states and from states in the anti-terrorist coalition regarding the suppression of terrorism has improved. Guidelines have been approved for officers on duty in emergency and critical situations, as have procedures for interacting and informing the bodies of the Ministry of Interior, Civil Defense, Fire and Emergency Service. Daily instructions are given to rule out cases bordering on elements of terrorism, which could lead to the preparation or commission of acts having a bearing on the security of the railway infrastructure and the safety of passengers and cargo.

A system of security measures in civil aviation has been built up in line with the Standards and Recommendations of Annex 17 of the Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The Ministry of Interior Act, the Civil Aviation Act, and Regulation No 17/99 regulate this system. Security measures will be stepped up if the probability increases that an act of unlawful interference might occur. Actions in that direction were undertaken as early as on September 11, 2001 under Annex L of Document 30 (“Safety”) of ECAC.

The Bulgarian legal system and the newly passed practical measures do not allow asylum to be granted to any persons who finance, plan, aid or commit terrorist acts or provide asylum to such persons.

Under the currently enforced Refugee Act, refugee status shall not be granted to a foreign national if there are grounds to suppose that he/she commits or abets acts contrary to the goals and principles of the United Nations – which terrorist acts undoubtedly are (Article 13, sub-paragraph 3 with reference to Article 1R of the Convention on the Status of Refugees of 1951). This provision, as well as many others of the Refugee Act under Article 13, is effectively applied to refuse asylum to persons who finance, plan, aid or commit terrorist acts

Whenever an extradition request is made, the Ministry of Justice, as a central authority under the European Convention on Extradition, should send a notice to the Agency for Refugees, in order to prevent that refugee status be granted to a person who has planned, aided or participated in the commission of terrorist acts.

Furthermore, the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, Section I, Article 1a excludes crimes against humanity as grounds for refusing extradition for political reasons.

By taking legislative and practical measures, the Bulgarian state is implementing effective control against the use of its territory by persons who are aiming at financing, planning, aiding or perpetrating terrorist acts targeted against other states or their citizens.

The Bulgarian Penal Code contains special provisions that incriminate any use of the Bulgarian territory for preparation and perpetration of terrorist acts against other States (Art. 3566 of the Penal Code). Moreover, Art. 10, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 4 of the Foreign Nationals in the Republic of Bulgaria Act provides for not allowing into the territory of the country any foreign citizens, suspected of planning to commit terrorist acts.

The measures for implementing judicial cooperation for the prevention of terrorist acts and for punishing their perpetrators are realized currently both on the basis of the existing bilateral and multilateral international agreements and under the conditions of reciprocity.

In relation to the provisions for legal assistance for detection and sentencing of persons involved in preparation and implementation of terrorist acts, the Republic of Bulgaria has ratified the Council of Europe's Convention on Judicial Assistance in Criminal Cases and Extradition, and also the Convention on Repression of Terrorism. Therefore, there are no obstacles to implementing judicial cooperation and rendering assistance in investigations or proceedings against criminal offenses related to the funding or aiding of terrorist acts, including assistance in providing of evidence available in Bulgaria, if the same are required for the competent authorities of other states.

The Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) contains separate sections on extradition and legal assistance with regard to criminal cases, their provision being in conformity with the international standards in the area of the judicial co-operation. These regulations are applicable unless otherwise provided under international agreements to which the Republic of Bulgaria is party. Besides in the case of existence of an international agreement, the extradition and judicial assistance may be also implemented under the conditions of reciprocity, if such an agreement has not been concluded (Art. 439a, paragraph 1, and Art. 461, paragraph 1 of the CPC).

In relation to the possibilities for implementing judicial cooperation in the field of the suppression of organized crime, fraud, corruption, money laundering and terrorism, it is notable that the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria routinely takes into consideration international agreements that have been ratified, promulgated and implemented as a part of Bulgarian domestic law. The Bulgarian Constitution affirms the primacy of international agreements over any domestic legislation that is in conflict with them. The above-mentioned criminal and procedural regulations, together with the established primacy of international agreements, create the necessary conditions for effective countering of the organized crime, fraud, corruption, money laundering, and terrorism and for the efficient judicial co-operation with the other member-countries in this area.

In view of streamlining the procedures applied under judicial assistance, and also in view of expediting the exchange of information, the Ministry of Finance (and particularly the Financial Intelligence Bureau) uses legal provisions related to suspicions of money laundering. In such cases, the Measures against Money Laundering Act empowers the Financial Intelligence Bureau to exchange without any limitation information on the basis of bilateral or international agreements or on the basis of reciprocity, including information containing banking secrets.

CONTRIBUTION

The Republic of Bulgaria is party to the key international conventions in the fields of transnational organized crime, illicit narcotic drugs trafficking, money laundering, illicit traffic of arms, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially lethal materials.

With regard to the fulfillment of the requirements of Resolutions 1269/1999, 1368/2001 and 1373/2001 of the UN Security Council the following actions have been taken by Bulgaria:

1. Bulgaria refuses to issue permits for foreign trade transactions in arms and dual-use goods and technologies with countries against which sanctions have been imposed by international organizations in relation to exports to certain states and regions. Bulgaria strictly complies with all commitments ensuing from its participation in international organizations and regimes, and also by virtue of its bilateral agreements with other countries.
2. Bulgarian export control authorities participate more intensely in the work of the international organizations and regimes whose activities are related to the control of foreign trade activities in arms and dual-use goods and technologies.
3. The country takes actions on a continuous basis to identify production enterprises and companies whose activities may fall under the Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CPDSUCWD).
4. To date, more than 100 potential business entities have been covered and monitored, and they are required to provide information on annual basis of their planned and actually performed activities involving toxic chemical substances and precursors subject to declaration and control.

5. In view of obtaining as much accurate information as possible, special forms for collection of industrial data on the production, processing, use, storage, and transfer of controlled toxic chemical substances have been developed and continuously improved.
6. A special Data Base is under construction for the purpose of continuously monitoring of the identified business entities related to CPD-SUCWD. Each production enterprise has nominated a contact person on the issues of enforcement of CPDSUCWD.
7. Modern communications have been introduced for liaison with enterprises and companies in relation to fulfillment of their responsibilities under the Chemical Weapon and Control of Toxic Chemical Substances and their Precursors Act (CWCTCSPA).
8. On specific occasions, proposals have been made on the mandatory tying up of the Custom Tariff items with CAS registration numbers of toxic chemical substances and precursors, subject to declaration and control of Lists 1, 2 and 3 of CPDSUCWD. The purpose is to obtain full and accurate information both on the completed transfers and on the companies, carrying out such transfers.

In order to intensify the regional responsibility and the active counteraction of international terrorism and international organized crime, the Republic of Bulgaria will implement in regional terms the measures provided for in the EU Action Plan in the Area of the Police Co-operation. In this regard, actions will be taken for:

- Updating bilateral agreements with the Republic of Greece and the Republic of Romania for fighting cross-border crime by concluding intergovernmental agreements for police cooperation, regulating exclusively the procedures and conditions for cross-border prosecution and monitoring and provision of mutual operating assistance;
- Entering into an intergovernmental agreement for police cooperation with the Republic of Macedonia and FR Yugoslavia;
- Reviewing the bilateral and multilateral agreements (such as those within the Black Sea Region Economic Co-operation) with Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, etc.

Bulgaria expects assistance for the training of specialists in all areas of security in civil aviation. This will include assistance in developing new procedures for the x-ray inspection of checked luggage, provision of technical equipment for security purposes (x-ray machines, metal detector frames, etc.) ensuring the membership of the Republic of Bulgaria in the European Agency for Civil Aviation Safety (EACA).

International terrorist organizations actively use refugee flows as a cover for the movement of their own members. Due to its geographic location, Bulgaria is an attractive destination for the long-term or temporary settlement of refugees and is therefore almost inevitably a transit point for immigrants heading to EU member countries. For this reason Bulgaria is taking measures to secure its borders. The country prepares for turning the borders into an external border of the EU. Over the past four years, the Government undertaken projects that will strengthen the institutional, human resources, and technical structures responsible for border security and control over refugees.

Border authorities determine whether an asylum seeker has been involved in terrorist acts by recording his/her identifying characteristics and by keeping other samples for comparative investigation. In accordance with the Refugees Act (SG, Issue 53/1999), Art. 44, paragraphs 2 through 4, these measures are mandatory and are within the responsibility of the competent authorities conducting the procedures for granting refugee status. In view of eliminating shortages and loopholes in the existing legislation, a Draft-Law on Asylum and Refugees is under preparation and the ministries and agencies concerned are coordinating its implementation.

In accordance with the existing procedures and mechanisms for granting refugee status in the Republic of Bulgaria, the officers of the Council of Ministers' Agency for Refugees conduct procedural actions to establish the reasons that have motivated any person to seek asylum in this country. In the process, it may be discovered that the person does not deserve international protection. To refuse refugee status, it is sufficient to establish that "there are serious grounds to suppose" that one of the following acts has been committed: "a war crime or a crime against peace and mankind; a serious crime of a non-political nature outside the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria; actions in conflict with the goals and principles of the United Nations" (Refugees Act, Art. 13, paragraphs 1 through 3). No formal evidence for previous criminal investigation is required.

The Republic of Bulgaria ratified the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism on February 17, 1998 with one reservation. Parliament stated that, "The Republic of Bulgaria reserves the right, in accordance with Art. 13, paragraph 1 of the Convention, to refuse extradition with regard to any of the crimes enumerated in Art. 1, if the crime is regarded as a political crime. The Republic of Bulgaria interprets its reservation in the sense that homicide or any crime implying homicide will not be regarded as a political crime." The Convention became effective for this country on May 18, 1998.

In October 2001 the Government approved and forwarded for consideration to the National Assembly a draft-law on the withdrawal of the above-mentioned reservation. On November 28, 2001 the National Assembly passed the Act on the Withdrawal of the Reservation Concerning the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Thus, at present, the Republic of Bulgaria may not refuse the extradition of a person who has perpetrated a terrorist act, when the crime for which the extradition is requested as a political crime, even if it includes homicide.

The country has signed, ratified, and implemented the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and two of the Protocols thereto: The Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ratified on April 12, 2001).

Bulgaria is a party to the key Conventions on Narcotic Drugs and the main Protocols to them: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 and the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as well as the further Amendment to the Protocol of March 25, 1972. The country is also party to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, signed in Vienna on February 21, 1971 and the United Nations Convention on Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988.

In compliance with the Resolutions of the UN Security Council, the EU and OSCE, the Council of Ministers' Special Decree No 91 of April 9, 2001 approved a list of states and organizations against which a ban or restrictions on sales and deliveries of armaments, related equipment, and dual-use goods and technologies were imposed.

As an OSCE member country, in November 2000 Bulgaria made a political commitment to the implementation of the principles, norms, and measures included in the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). On February 1, 2001 the Council of Ministers approved the above OSCE Document and its nation-wide implementation.

The training of antiterrorist-specialists is a basic component of this fight. To this aim Bulgaria is looking for Western experience, financial, and material assistance. This assistance is expected to be offered concurrently with Bulgaria's own practical efforts for the prevention of criminal acts of individual persons or terrorist groups. We expect the assistance to be provided in the forms know-how, specialized software, and cooperation in terms of exchange of information, expertise, and training of specialists to use technical means for detection of prohibited and particularly hazardous materials. Assistance could also be offered in the field of ex-

change of experience regarding enforcement of the Measures against Money Laundering Act.

The Government of the Republic of Bulgaria welcomes the adoption of Resolution 1373 (2001) by the United Nations Security Council. Bulgaria has implemented practical measures for its enforcement and will continue to improve its efforts in this regard. Through various legislative and administrative measures, the Bulgarian government exerts effective control against the use of its territory by individuals and legal entities who are suspected of planning, aiding, financing, or perpetrating terrorist acts against other countries or their citizens. The Bulgarian government makes and will continue to make efforts on bilateral and multilateral bases aiming at the signing, ratifying, and enforcement by the UN member-countries of all universal and regional conventions related to the fight against terrorism and in particular the Convention of 1999 on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The Republic of Bulgaria will actively and constructively contribute at all international forums to the adoption and enforcement of an effective international legal system against terrorism, including a general UN convention against terrorism, which should be a universal framework for reference concerning the multitude of international legal instruments against terrorism.

SECURITY RISK REDUCTION: BULGARIA'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT*

The perennial debate of intentions vs. capabilities has become a starting point in most foreign policy analyses. However, the post-Cold War predominance of low-intensity conflicts and the harsh realities of September 11 have made non-proliferation the order of the day. This urged policy-makers to confront the long-standing policy of denial, so that potential terrorists are prevented from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means for delivery.

Bulgaria has an impressive record of supporting the international efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD. Bulgaria does not possess nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. The country has signed all major multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament and WMD non-proliferation. Similarly, except for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Bulgaria participates in the existing international export control regimes such as the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zanger Committee, the Wassenaar Arrangement on export control for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies.

Given the prospects of institutionalizing its return to the European mainstream, since 1989 Bulgaria has been increasingly involved in multiple risk reduction endeavors. We are fully aware that meeting the highest standards of non-proliferation is an investment in our European and Euro-Atlantic future. Bulgaria's responsible conduct in the realm of arms control and disarmament is *inter alia* a vital ingredient of the country's overall strategy for EU and NATO accession. In wider terms, this policy is geared towards strengthening international security and stability, promoting predictability in interstate relations and countering terrorism on a global scale.

These positive results are reached along two major avenues (1) involve-

* This article expresses the personal views of the authors only. It does not necessarily reflect Bulgarian official positions.

ment in the multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD, small arms and certain inhumane conventional weapons with indiscriminate effects; and (2) membership in international export control regimes and stringent national policy to control foreign trade activities in arms and dual-use goods and technologies. In both cases, respect for internationally imposed arms embargoes and sanctions has become the benchmark of Bulgaria's responsible policy of export control. By no means exhaustive, these cooperative dimensions of Bulgaria's risk reduction capability mainly focus on supply-side initiatives. Bulgaria has an impressive record on the demand-side of the equation as well. Though beyond the scope of this article, it is worth reiterating that our predictable, credible and reliable foreign policy, especially vis-a-vis the conflicts in the Balkans, is geared towards building confidence and trust in inter-state relations, addressing the root causes of conflicts and offering political solutions.

BULGARIA AND MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENTS FOR SECURITY RISK REDUCTION: A BALANCE SHEET

Bulgaria is among the 66 member states of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which to this day remains the sole negotiating forum for multilateral disarmament. In a similar vein, Bulgaria is a signatory to all major multilateral instruments in the area of arms control and disarmament. The latter forms the cornerstone of today's non-proliferation regime in the field of nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional weapons. At the same time however, we favor the comprehensive and integrated approach to apply all non-proliferation measures at the global, regional and sub-regional level. Bulgaria's practical approach towards WMD non-proliferation is also based on the country's stance of *de facto* US and NATO ally in the anti-terrorist campaign. Thus WMD non-proliferation has been recognized as a major underlying factor in global efforts to fight terrorism. It reduces the risk of terrorist entities gaining access to WMD and their means of delivery.

Bulgaria has a long-standing record in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. The country has become a part of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in outer space by acceding to all relevant multilateral treaties (the 1967 Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects; and the 1974 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space). In July 1969 Bul-

garia ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), thus becoming one of the first countries to endorse this pillar of global nuclear disarmament. Bulgaria supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Extension and Review Conference. Aiming to further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Bulgaria ushered in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by being among the first countries to sign (September 1996) and ratify (September 1999) this important treaty. In a similar vein, Bulgaria is one of the strongest proponents to launch Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations.

As a corollary, since 1970 Bulgaria has been applying the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, which aim to authorize the use of nuclear power only for peaceful purposes and prevent its diversion to military usage. Elected as a member of the IAEA Governing Board in 2001, Bulgaria is an advocate of greater viability of the IAEA safeguards regime in the post-September 11 environment. We believe that the IAEA safeguard system, including the accession to and the implementation of the Additional Protocols by the member states, is an essential instrument for preventive action against terrorism. Bulgaria supports the international efforts to limit the scope of the terrorist threat by strengthening the nuclear safety norms and preventing the acquisition and use of radionuclide materials by potential terrorists. The IAEA plays an important role in this area. The Agency has a panoply of tools to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism. The spectrum of further measures should include improved border control and reinforced detection capabilities. These measures should be implemented on a priority basis by each state, bilaterally or within the IAEA framework.

Effective April 29, 1997 Bulgaria applies the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Bulgarian legislation is fine-tuned to incorporate the CWC provisions. For example, in January 2000 Bulgaria adopted a Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Control on Toxic Chemicals and Their Precursors to implement the convention and to improve its control on foreign trade activities in dual-use toxic chemicals. In its current capacity as an Executive Council member in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Bulgaria is actively involved in the international efforts to universalize the Convention by having as many countries on board as possible. For example, Bulgaria was among the co-sponsors of the UN General Assembly Resolution on the co-operation between the UN and OPCW at the 2001 56th Session of the Assembly. Together with the US and most of the European countries, Bulgaria is also actively involved in the efforts to improve the efficiency and overall management of the OPCW.

Bulgaria has a long-standing record in preventing the use of biological weapons. That policy dates back to 1932 when Bulgaria ratified the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Along the same lines in 1972 Bulgaria acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Bulgaria submits annual reports on its compliance with the BWC provisions. In a similar vein, we are strongly supportive of the process to strengthen the BWC through the adoption of a reliable verification mechanism.

Bulgaria has a similar record in the realm of preventing the spread of conventional weapons. Aiming to destroy the surplus of certain Warsaw Pact-era conventional inventories, Bulgaria is a party to the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty and its subsequent Adaptation Agreement of November 1999. In 1998 Bulgaria ratified the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines and on their Destruction. It is worth emphasizing that by the end of 2000 Bulgaria completely destroyed its APLs stockpiles, thus complying with the Treaty's timeframe two years in advance. On a regional scale, Bulgaria and Turkey agreed in March 1999 on the non-use of APLs and their removal from or destruction in the areas adjacent to their common border. This bilateral agreement, effective May 1, 2002 is an important contribution to the objectives of the Ottawa Treaty and all international efforts to destroy those inhumane weapons. This is an important indicator of the growing confidence and trust among the countries in South-east Europe (SEE).

By the end of 2000 Bulgaria completely destroyed its APLs stockpiles, thus complying with the Treaty's timeframe two years in advance.

The illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) poses another set of security challenges. Considering that SALW have been the most frequently used weapons in recent armed conflicts in the Western Balkans, Bulgaria is particularly concerned with the security risks associated with the destabilizing effect of their accumulation and – in the context of post-conflict disarmament, de-mobilization and reintegration (DD&R) programs – their destruction. One illuminating example of Bulgaria's commitment to counter SALW proliferation is the speedy implementation of the Bulgarian-US agreement on the destruction of surplus SALW (about 80 000 units), signed on July 19, 2001. Furthermore, in its capacity as a EU applicant and negotiating country, Bulgaria has formally

aligned itself to the criteria and principles stated in the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and since then consistently adhere to all relevant guidelines, decisions and statements of the European Council. In November 2000 Bulgaria also associated itself with the OSCE Document on SALW that provides for information exchange on the national marking and register systems, as well as export practices and destruction methods.

Along those lines, as a co-chair of Working Table 3 (on Security Issues) of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, in October 2000 Bulgaria hosted a Stability Pact Seminar on SALW Collection and Destruction. As a parallel to this event Sofia also hosted an informal meeting of the Group of UN Governmental Experts, which discussed the feasibility of restricting the manufacture and trade in SALW to only state-authorized manufacturers and dealers. We think it is paramount to design a strong legal base to regulate the overall process of production, trading, brokering and possession of small arms. The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in SALW in All its Aspects, held in July 2001, set an auspicious beginning to check the proliferation of these weapons. There, Bulgaria argued that the complex nature of SALW proliferation should be addressed from the perspective of both supply and demand, thus making inter-institutional interaction a must. We are pleased that Bulgaria's role in addressing the SALW proliferation threats was duly recognized as our country was invited to join the UN Group of Experts on SALW Marking and Tracing. This group, hopefully, will reinforce the efforts to design a well coordinated approach to address SALW proliferation.

BULGARIA'S EXPORT CONTROL POLICY: BRIDGING INTENTIONS WITH CAPABILITIES

Amidst the triumph of economic liberalism supply-side international export control regimes have come to be identified as reliable instruments to balance the competing priorities of free trade and non-proliferation.

MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES

The controlling mechanisms enforced in Bulgaria strictly follow the requirements and restrictions imposed by UN Security Council resolutions, by decisions of the European Union, the OSCE, the Wassenaar Arrangement and other multilateral and regional instruments. Control lists applied by Bulgaria effectively implement the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List in the field of arms trade and the unified and annually updated EU List

of dual-use goods and technologies as well as the lists and the guidelines of the Australia Group. In 2001 Bulgaria was officially admitted to the Australia Group. We consider this to be yet another indication of our increasingly efficient export control system. Bulgaria is strongly committed to further cooperate actively and effectively towards the prevention of the spread of chemical and biological weapons.

Bulgaria has repeatedly indicated its willingness to become a member of the MTCR. Despite the fact that Bulgaria is not a member of the regime, it strictly abides by the MTCR Guidelines as part of its export control policy. As a corollary, Bulgaria is a strongly committed member of the Wassenaar Arrangement whose lists cover, *inter alia*, the armaments and technologies controlled by MTCR. Furthermore, in November 2001 the Bulgarian government officially committed itself to the decommissioning and destruction of its stockpile of SS-23 missiles by October 2002.

In addition to these steps, Bulgaria has been working to promote responsible arms transfers and to prevent illicit arms trafficking in Southeast Europe and elsewhere. In December 1999, Bulgaria with the support of the US held a Regional Conference on Export Controls. This conference, organised under the aegis of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, adopted two documents of particular importance: (1) Joint Declaration on Responsible Arms Transfers; and (2) Statement on Harmonization of End-Use/End User Certificates. Sofia recently hosted another event of great importance. The meeting of the Troika of EU Conventional Arms Exports Working Group (COARM) with the participation of associated countries was held – for the first time outside Brussels – in Sofia on April 9, 2002.

The Bulgarian government officially committed itself to the decommissioning and destruction of its stockpile of SS-23 missiles by October 2002.

NATIONAL EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM

The current Bulgarian export control system is designed to meet the most advanced European and international standards in monitoring foreign trade activities in arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Relevant legislation was adopted in 1995 and 1996 to align the Bulgarian legislation with the provisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement. It is worth emphasizing that the current Bulgarian legislation includes a “catch-all” clause, which under particular circumstances provides for the control of non-listed goods and technologies.

Under the current Law on Control of Foreign Trade Activities in Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and the Regulations on its implementation, Bulgaria's export control regime includes a two-tier licensing and control mechanism consisting of two inter-agency bodies:

1. The Interministerial Council at the Council of Ministers is the only body authorized to license Bulgarian companies intending to perform foreign trade activities in arms and dual goods and technologies.
2. The applications submitted by licensed companies for permits are considered on a case-by-case basis by the Commission for Control and Permission of the Foreign Trade Deals in Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies with the Ministry of Economy.

That system offers important advantages, namely general or partial licensing of companies which meet the criteria for foreign trade in arms and/or dual-use goods and technologies for a period of up to 12 months; consideration on a case-by-case basis and issuing, where appropriate, of a permit for each individual transaction; and post-shipment verification.

Furthermore, in line with its consistent policy and in the wake of the tragic events of September 11, Bulgaria introduced additional measures aimed at enhancing the existing export controls, and preventing illicit deals via third countries or brokers. On January 17, 2002 a draft amendment to the Law on the Control of Foreign Trade Activities in Arms and in Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was adopted by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the Parliament for its approval. The draft underwent the procedure of first reading and approval is pending before this summer. The following improvements to the national legislation are being put forward as part of this bill:

- Measures aimed at improving enforcement at national level. Compulsory lists of States that are placed under UN or EU embargoes and other international restrictions will be introduced as part of the implementing Regulation of the amended Law on Trade with Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. These "commitment" lists will be subject to approval by the Council of Ministers and will be updated at regular intervals. Dealers and companies obtaining a general license for trade in arms and dual use goods and technologies will be obliged to fully comply with such lists;
- Precise definition of the prerogatives of the state authorities that execute control over transactions, as well as of obligations and responsibilities of companies and dealers;
- Inclusion of additional provisions, requiring submission of all relevant documents certifying the legitimate end-use/end-user and mandatory post-shipment verification;

- Enhanced sanctions against possible violators, including amendments to the Penal Code;
- Improved control over brokering activities. Any such activities carried out in and from the territory of Bulgaria shall be treated as trade activities falling under relevant legislative provisions. This would also imply the establishment of a register of companies and persons performing brokering activities in arms and dual-use goods and technologies.

COMPLIANCE WITH SANCTIONS

Bulgaria is particularly committed to one form of security risk reduction, namely compliance with internationally and unilaterally imposed coercive measures such as arms embargoes, sanctions, restrictions or prohibitions to conduct arms transfers to particular “sensitive destinations”. Mentioned in relation to past transfers to UNITA in Angola, it is worth reiterating that Bulgaria actively and closely co-operated with the UN Panel of experts for investigation of violations of UNSC sanctions against UNITA. The collaboration and assistance extended by Bulgaria were highly appreciated.

Respect for UN-imposed sanctions has proven to be reliable credentials of each country’s readiness to balance security concerns with commercial gains. The Bulgarian Government is committed to maintaining effective enforcement of export controls in line with NATO and EU standards. It has made maximum restraint a national policy when considering permits for the export of arms and dual-use items to all destinations where risks are judged considerable, in particular to regions where conflict is occurring or imminent (criteria of the EU Code of Conduct, the Wassenaar Arrangement, etc.). The Government has established the regular practice of adopting special normative acts (decrees) to implement Bulgaria’s obligations under the UNSC Resolutions and the decisions of the EU and OSCE.

The Bulgarian Government has made maximum restraint a national policy when considering permits for the export of arms and dual-use items to all destinations where risks are judged considerable.

One telling example is the Decree No 91 adopted by the Government on April 9, 2001, establishing a consolidated List of countries and organizations towards which the Republic of Bulgaria applies prohibitions or restrictions (depending on each case) on the sale and supply of arms and related equipment in accordance with UNSC resolutions and decisions of

The harmonization of the Bulgarian export control system with the practice applied by the leading countries in this field represents an important political signal to our partners from EU and NATO about Bulgaria's responsible and transparent policy.

the EU and the OSCE. The adoption of this normative act, which in fact reproduces the respective List prepared by the Council of the EU, consolidates the practice of systematic application of international sanctions and the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct. This list is to be updated regularly and in correspondence to the EU list and the national commitments. The harmonization of the Bulgarian export control system with the practice applied by the leading countries in this field represents an important political signal to our partners from EU and NATO about Bulgaria's responsible and transparent policy.

Thus, apart from ensuring compliance with the UN sanctions against Angola (UNITA), Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sierra Leone, and terrorist organisations irrespective of territory, this list names other destinations of concern where conflict is occurring or imminent. These self-restraints, alongside our participation in international export control regimes, highlight Bulgaria's resolve to be a reliable and trustworthy European and Euro-Atlantic partner.

CONCLUSION

Though focused exclusively on supply-side efforts, this article has tried to outline the panoply of risk reduction endeavors, undertaken by Bulgaria after 1989. Aspiring for NATO and the EU, Bulgaria is strongly committed to ensure a responsible national policy with regard to transfer of arms to particular "sensitive" destinations. Last but not least, compliance with internationally imposed embargoes is a benchmark of Bulgaria's commitment to be a net contributor to security. In parallel, our country is a strong proponent of the integrated approach to address proliferation risks. Thus, whilst avoiding duplication, multilateral instruments are applied at global, regional and sub-regional levels in a well-coordinated fashion. This, hopefully, would endow inter-state relations with an even greater degree of transparency and predictability, so that enhanced security and stability are achieved.

APPENDIX 6

DECLARATION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA CONCERNING THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS

Sofia, September 21, 2001

Bringing to notice its fundamental position of denunciation of the barbarian terrorist acts laid down in the Declaration of September 12, 2001 the Republic of Bulgaria voices again its stand of firm and staunch deprecation and opposition to all forms of terrorism, whether national or international in nature, and whether political, religious, ethnic, social or other in inducement;

Underlining the strive of the Republic of Bulgaria to become a full member of NATO;

Led by the conviction that international terrorism is a serious threat to peace and stability, and confirming also the affiliation of the Republic of Bulgaria to the family of the countries sharing the values of democracy, humanity and freedom,

THE THIRTY-NINTH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

1. Supports the efforts of the United Nations and the international community to build a global coalition for fight against the terrorism and expresses the willingness of the Republic of Bulgaria to be an effective participant in this process;
2. Declares its support to the Statement of the North Atlantic Council of September 12, 2001 in the spirit of its own declaration of the same date;
3. Expresses solidarity with the countries victims of terrorism and is firmly determined to provide all-round assistance for neutralizing, including

identification, tracking out, detention and turning over, of all persons or groups associated with terrorist activities;

4. Supports the position of the Government of September 13, 2001 for the Republic of Bulgaria assisting as a *de facto* ally of the United States and NATO in the measures for fight against global terrorism and adhering to the commitments originating from the North Atlantic Treaty, including Art. 5, in conformity with the national interest of the country to become a full member of NATO.
5. Confirming the willingness of the Republic of Bulgaria to provide, on the basis of the Agreement between the Republic of Bulgaria and NATO on the transit of NATO forces and staff, the necessary assistance for transit, service and logistic support of respective units under the conditions of providing additional support.
6. Calls on the Government of Bulgaria to make further efforts together with the allies to guarantee the national security of the Republic of Bulgaria as well as the security of every citizen in the country.
7. Declares the fight against all forms of terrorism in the world as a long-term priority of the Republic of Bulgaria.

APPENDIX 7

DECLARATION ON BULGARIA'S ELECTION AS NON-PERMANENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER DURING 2002 - 2003

Promulgated, State Gazette, No 89, October 16, 2001

Emphasizing the important role of the United Nations for ensuring lasting peace and security in the world;

Confirming the consensus among the parliamentary represented political forces on the irreversible process of Bulgaria's accession to NATO and the European Union and the effective cooperation with these organizations and the other applicant countries;

Underlining Bulgaria's successful foreign policy that turned the country into stability and security factor in the region of Southeast Europe;

Taking note of the position of the Republic of Bulgaria on the establishment of a global coalition against terrorism after the events of September 11, 2001;

The thirty-ninth National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria:

1. Highly appreciates Bulgaria's success in being elected for this extremely important post as a deserved recognition and proof of the country's stability and reputation, as well as a clear sign of confidence in Bulgaria on the grounds of its active presence in the international community.
2. States its readiness to provide full support for Bulgaria's active, constructive and thorough work as a UN Security Council member at a time when the UN is facing one of the greatest challenges in its history: the fight against international terrorism.
3. Highly appreciates the October 4 decision of the NATO Council and particularly the Allies' commitment to provide assistance to states, which

are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism, describing it as an epitome of relations between *de facto* Allies and as collective security.

4. Expresses Bulgaria's determination to contribute to the consolidation of the international community along democracy and progress, to international peace and security, sustainable economic development, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

The Declaration was adopted by the Thirty-ninth National Assembly on October 10, 2001 and is sealed with the official stamp of the National Assembly.