

WAR AGAINST TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BULGARIAN MILITARY

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THE BULGARIAN OPTION

Any analysis of 9/11's impact on Bulgaria and especially on the national military should begin with clarification how this date and the consequent events reflected on and still influence Bulgarian society. One of the noticeable changes that took place in the United States was not only the outburst of patriotism but also a sharp rise in the level of public trust in the state institutions, especially in the American military. A similar effect did not occur, however, in Bulgaria. The reason is clear: the sense of public insecurity of the Bulgarians is relatively much higher than the U.S. and Western European societies. The reason is not "the new threat" but the purely internal social grounds like one of the lowest living standards in Europe, wide spread administrative and political corruption, personal insecurity especially for the property, local and regional organized crime that even challenges the states in the region, high level of unemployment (officially about 17%), irresolvable problems like the "Roma problem", etc. Thus, it is not September 11 but rather the unacceptable level of individual and public insecurity that had raised the issue of building more powerful security institutions and delegating extra powers to them in order to combat the internal threats to security. There are a lot of significant differences in Bulgarian and U.S. threat perception but the most important one is that the Bulgarian society

is ready to sacrifice even the newly obtained liberties and personal freedoms only to obtain higher individual, family and social status of security. As can be seen in these social expectations the role of the military is not and could not be too significant. However, September 11, the war against Saddam Hussein' regime and forthcoming membership in NATO give different focus and dynamic to the Bulgarian security sector including military reform.

In the 20th century, terrorism has occasionally presented a security problem to Bulgaria for relatively short periods of time. There has never been a terrorist training camp in Bulgaria, nor has the country ever been used as a staging ground for terrorist acts against other countries. The acts of terror in last fifty years were related only with the imposed change of the names of the Muslim population that was initiated by the communist regime in the mid 1980s. Several terrorist acts against civilian objects were initiated then by the ethnic Turkish terrorists. Later, according to some journalist investigations, persons involved in terrorist activities have only passed through Bulgaria or stayed there for a short time. Because of this the country has not significant experience in multilateral co-operation for combating terrorism.

Until the mid 1990s the Armed Forces in particular had neither a concrete legitimate role nor the appropriate equipment and training to be a significant factor in combating any kind of terrorism. Than "the peace time combat duty" of (mainly) the Air Force and Air-Defence units was focused on reaction to unexpected attacks at an initial stage of aggression. Even the nuclear power plant that is on bank of the border Danube River (with Romania) had not special close air-defence. The strategic military intelligence, along with its typical roles, had also to monitor the terrorist groups in the region of Southeastern Europe, especially those that were related with national minorities.

The terrorist attacks that shook America and the world reflected Bulgaria and national military in a specific way. From the political and public view point the strike against some of the symbols of U.S. power and success were accepted as an attack against the new Bulgarian dream for prosperity and international significance. This explains why from the very first moment Bulgarian political and even the military elite as a whole fully shared the US new threat perception as a direct attack against the Bulgarian political paradigm. From the defence point of view the case is different. What now in the USA is called "homeland security" was the

basic paradigm of Bulgaria's national security during the entire Cold war period. State border defense, a totalitarian type of counterintelligence and "defence at any price" were not only core communist regime's policies but were "implanted" in the mentality of the Bulgarians. In exchange for a relatively low standard of living the people were ready to accept more and more spending on security and defence that in practice were instruments of guaranteeing the totalitarian political power. The break-up of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact were not the events that changed this thinking because the sense of insecurity continued to preoccupy public perceptions even after. The security vacuum has not only kept the security dilemma of the Bulgarians alive but has made it so significant that it has dominated the political debate until the late 1990s. What changed, radically, the content of social and political security expectations were the wars in former Yugoslavia. Ten years of bloody fighting, terror and ethnic cleansing have made national security and armed forces different. NATO became attractive for the majority of the population not because of values or military effectiveness but because NATO would prevent similar bloodshed from happening in Bulgaria.

These developments were both painful (because they have caused a significant delay of the transition developments in comparison to the Central European countries) and creative (because they have facilitated faster and radical reforms) but as a whole they were supportive to the defense reform. Designing defense reform and drafting the new Military Doctrine between 1997 and 1999 introduced a new definition of "defense". The fifty-year old vision on the possible armed conflict was replaced by a more realistic threat perception and a very different idea about the new armed forces was politically and professionally approved. For the first time during the last 50 years the defense-related policies were based on Bulgaria's own evaluation of the events that were happening in the neighboring Balkan area, Caucasus and the Near East during the entire period of the 1990s. The Armed Forces made a significant shift from the previous focus on deterrence, total war and mass army towards conflict prevention, crisis management and co-operative security contribution.

Thus, since 1998 the Bulgarian military were involved in a debate on possible new role and missions, different size, structure and doctrine of the forces. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the bio-terrorist acts that followed, have prompted a review on the division of responsibilities: which institution is doing what in order to provide secu-

riety to meet the new threats. The definition of “foreign aggressor” has been changed to introduce terrorism of any kind, including political, ethnic religious and criminal terrorism with global, regional and national sources. This process brought about reaffirmation of the roles of security organizations, but the debate was also focussed on ways to make a better use of their specific capacities and to provide multilevel guarantees. The upcoming membership of NATO and the preparation for joining the European Union (EU) led to a broad political and public debate on the necessary Constitutional amendments including those related to national security and the roles of the security sector in the context of both membership in those organizations and neutralization of the new threats.

Following those debates the Bulgarian military have faced related specific problems in both internal and international context. From an internal point of view the defense of the homeland is now viewed as a primary mission not only of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and its security is expected to be guaranteed not only by the security services. The debate is still going on but even now it is clear that a fundamental shift in the mindset of security sector decision-makers is required. The expected new National Security Concept² will inevitably require that the Armed Forces take into consideration the employment of military capacity in ways previously outside the scope of operations. In contrast to the processes in the United States for example, where the homeland security now is not viewed as exclusively or even primarily a military task, in Bulgaria the question is how to effectively reorient the military machine from territorial defense to homeland security. It is obvious that the national security sector will be assisted by the local authorities, the private sector, and the citizens to perform multiple tasks on political and operational level in an integrated manner. These actions should be synchronized with the measures that are being taken on the international front to prosecute the war against transnational and global terrorism. For this purpose, changes in the definition of “defense”, the constitutional role of the Armed Forces, the Military Doctrine³ as well in the organization, equipment and training of the forces are required. Success will depend largely upon the politicians and senior security sector⁴ professionals’ ability (especially the military leadership) to achieve coherence in all aspects of the necessary reforms.

In international context, the Bulgarian military are expected to continue to be an important instrument of both regional security policy and NATO and European Union integration strategy. However, the capacity required

to contribute to the war against terrorism has not been completely clarified. The country reacts a case-by-case base to every single request for support and any performance conceptualization is still to be done. There are several tracks on which such capacities could and should be developed. These include overall modernization and reorganization of the Armed Forces, adaptation of part of these forces to the newly established *NATO Response Force* (NRF), preparation of specific components of the national military infrastructure to be used for global deployment and operation-support and further internal integration within the national security sector. All these developments should be accompanied by new legislation, serious modernization of equipment and weaponry and a totally different system of training. Keeping in mind that even from the US, NATO and EU point of view the process is still in the initial stage of development, the aim to adapt the Bulgarian military (together with the national security sector) to the war against terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation and other transnational threats looks extremely difficult. An important positive factor is the reality of political and professional consensus that the necessary work should be done.

CONTRIBUTION TO ANTI-TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY: STATUS QUO ANTE

During the pre-1990 period of communist rule in Bulgaria, the organizational structure, mechanism of command and control over the defense and security sector strictly followed the Soviet model and was quite similar to the practices in other Warsaw Pact countries. In the specific Bulgarian circumstances of a concentrated authoritarian rule the security sector often had been used to protect mainly the personal power of the Secretary General of the Communist Party and his close circle, and thus to seize the control even over the party's apparatus itself. In this sense, the security sector has been used as a tool for preserving the unlimited power of the state and party *nomenclature*, and could not follow the principles of political neutrality and impartiality, a substantial element of civil-military relations in a democratic society. The officer's corps was obliged to formally use the political propaganda slogans in order to assure their professional career but actually it was not really an active factor in the political life.

So the history of the communist regime, including the ‘perestroika’ phase, and the pre-Communist past do not suggest any applicable models for the new conditions of the post-Cold War world. Besides patriotic motivation, it was the example of the others, the Western countries, and the hope for the future that turned Bulgaria and its armed forces into major factors of stability and democratic development in the Balkans.

The establishment of the rule of law is at the very heart of a successful transition to and consolidation of democracy. The adoption and enforcement of legal acts, such as the Constitution, is of central importance to the rule of law. The 1990s have seen Bulgarians go down a tortuous path in their attempts to deal with the emerging issues of internal security and stability. The major political conflicts of the transition in Bulgaria, unlike in neighboring Balkan states, were resolved in a peaceful manner through the existing institutional frameworks despite several waves of massive popular discontent and nation-wide protest, such as in early 1997. The transformation of the whole security sector institutions to serve the rule of law, in contrast of the agencies of communist repression, was one of the main achievements of the Bulgarian transition through the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century. The ensuing challenges of this transformation have preoccupied the minds and efforts of political leaders across the spectrum.

The institutional underpinning of internal security can only be examined against the background of the *National Security Concept*, in force since 1998. This Concept was worked out over time, following a series of debates on the emerging realities at the turn of the century. It is, broadly speaking, structured along three basic elements. First, security is conceived in a broad context, to include new threats, such as those posed by transnational organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. It is perceived that “soft” security matters are linked to stability and security and therefore play a role in pursuing and achieving the political goals of integration into the EU and NATO). It incorporates the view that organized crime poses a threat to national security. Second, Bulgarian national security is perceived as intrinsically linked to European and Atlantic security, thus making international co-operation a fundamental precondition for ensuring security. Third, emphasis is placed on the “production” rather than “consumption” of security, thus focusing on a result-oriented approach to issues.

DEVELOPMENT OF POLICE AND SECRET SERVICES

In the past ten years, the legal and regulatory framework for the operation of special and police forces and other enforcement authorities has been established and developed. Part of their authority includes combating activities, which might be related to terrorism. There is no specific anti-terrorist legislation in Bulgaria, but activities that constitute forms or preparation of terrorist actions are deemed a criminal offence. Related texts exist in the Penal Code, Art. 96, Art. 97, Art. 97a, Art. 106, Art. 107 and the respective sections of the *Measures against Money Laundering Act*. The *Ministry of Interior Act* stipulates that one of the basic tasks of the National Security Service is to counter international terrorism and extremism (Art. 46, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 10) and the use of force or use of means jeopardizing the general public with a political purpose (Art. 46, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 4), which is in effect a terrorist activity. The National Service for Combating Organized Crime also has competencies for countering terrorism. According to some experts, this creates conditions for a lack of co-ordination and low efficiency of counteractions against terrorism. A careful reading and analysis of the respective texts of the *Ministry of Interior Act* and the *Regulation on its Enforcement* prompts the conclusion that the National Security Service (NSS) has the competencies of an information and analytical structure, while the National Service for Combating Organized Crime carries out operational and investigation activities. On the other hand, the NSS counters international terrorism and extremism, and the National Service for Combating Organised Crime counters “terrorist activities,” i.e. specific terrorist acts. In this sense, the difference between terrorism as a general phenomenon and its manifestations in terrorist acts was identified and established in Bulgaria as early as 1997 and 1998. The European Union adopted this distinction in the end of 2001 as well.

The Specialized Task Force for Fighting Terrorism (STFFT) and the Specialized Service for Combating Terrorist Activities, for Protection of Strategic and Particularly Important Sites and for Prevention and Detection of Serious Crimes are within the Ministry of Interior. STFFT is the structural unit implementing the immediate counteraction of terrorist acts. The specifics of STFFT and its operations in crisis situations have given grounds to Bulgarian legislators to explicitly stipulate that, “Use of the Special Task

Force shall be permitted by a written order of the Minister of Interior on case by case basis” (The *Ministry of Interior Act*, Article 157, paragraph 2). Therefore, the intelligence, analytical, detective and combat activities concerning the countering of terrorism in Bulgaria are concentrated in the Ministry of Interior. This is an essential condition for the unified management of forces and resources and for preventing any disorganization in the fight against terrorism. The Bulgarian Army also has structures that are trained mostly for support antiterrorist actions.

Currently, the main task of the competent Bulgarian institutions is to limit the possibilities for financing or any other support activities of international terrorist organizations. In addition to reviewing and updating the regulatory framework, specific measures have been taken as follows:

- The list of terrorist organisations that could possibly use the territory of the country, as well as the list of legal persons and organisations registered under Bulgarian laws, have been verified and supplemented.

- The *Measures Against Money Laundering Act* provides an expanded list of persons obligated to identify their clients and to report to the Agency of the Financial Intelligence Bureau any suspicious operations and transactions. This list already includes the Bulgarian National Bank, the Customs Administration, the Central Depository, sports organizations, pension funds, and dealers selling automobiles. A lower threshold for identification of clients in case of exchange of foreign currency was established. The right of the Agency of Financial Intelligence Bureau to gain access without court action to bank and commercial classified information, particularly in the cases where inquiries have been received from foreign financial intelligence authorities.

- Provisions have been made for the “freezing” of the financial assets of persons engaged in or trying to engage or assist in terrorist acts, as well as those of firms and corporations owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and structures, acting on behalf of such persons and structures, or under their instructions, including financial resources derived or created through property held or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons or persons or structures related to them. The provisions of Article 185 - *Obligations for Taking Measures to Prevent Crimes* - of the *Penal Procedure Code* states that, “the prosecutor and the investigator are obliged to take the necessary measures for preventing crime (including a terrorist act), for which there are grounds to expect that they will happened, including temporary seizure of the instruments with which the crime could be perpetrated.”

On December 10, 2001, the Council of Ministers adopted Decision No. 804 on the *Ratification of the Convention on Suppression of Financing Terrorism*. With a view to the Convention's effective enforcement after its ratification, amendments to the *Penal Code* and to other domestic legislation are to be passed; new legislation is to be adopted. These measures will bring Bulgaria's legislation into compliance with the provisions of Articles 4, 5, 8, and 18 of the Convention. These are pending changes in the Bulgarian legislation, and will reflect the latest recommendations made at the session of FATF held on October 31, 2001, as the Republic of Bulgaria will soon accede to it. The competent Bulgarian institutions directly engaged in the efforts to combat crime and with a view to actively countering terrorism in the context of Resolution 1373, have worked out and now implement the *Plan for Detecting and Preventing Terrorist Activities on the Territory of the Republic of Bulgaria*. As a follow-up to this Plan, additional measures have also been undertaken. These are aimed at:

- Establishing a strict regime and control over generally hazardous substances by extending the requirements to persons who apply for and hold firearms or handle explosives and other generally hazardous substances and enhancing the control over them.
- Actively countering crimes related to the use of explosives through operative measures.
- Carrying out complex security investigations at sites where explosives, strong poisons, and radioactive and other generally hazardous substances are kept.

Bulgaria is a party to the key international conventions in the fields of transnational organized crime, illicit narcotic drugs trafficking, money laundering, illicit traffic of arms, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially lethal materials.

With regard to fulfilling the requirements of Resolutions 1269/1999, 1368/2001 and 1373/2001 of the UN Security Council, the following actions have been taken by Bulgaria:

- Bulgaria refuses to issue permits for foreign trade transactions in arms and dual-use goods and technologies with countries against which sanctions have been imposed by international organizations in relation to exports to certain states and regions. Bulgaria strictly complies with all com-

mitments ensuing from its participation in international organizations and regimes, and also by virtue of its bilateral agreements with other countries.

- Bulgarian export control authorities participate more intensely in the work of the international organizations and regimes whose activities are related to the control of foreign trade activities in arms and dual-use goods and technologies.

- The country takes actions on a continuous basis to identify production enterprises and companies whose activities may fall under the Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CPDSUCWD).

- To date, more than a hundred suspicious business entities have been uncovered and monitored, and they are required to provide information on an annual basis of their planned and actually performed activities involving import and export of toxic chemical substances and precursors subject to declaration and control.

- In view of obtaining as much accurate information as possible, special forms for collection of industrial data on the production, processing, use, storage, and transfer of controlled toxic chemical substances have been developed and continuously improved.

- A special database is under construction for the purpose of continuously monitoring of the identified business entities related to CPDSUCWD. Each production enterprise has nominated a contact person on the issues of enforcement of CPDSUCWD.

- Modern communications have been introduced for liaison with enterprises and companies in relation to fulfillment of their responsibilities under the Chemical Weapon and Control of Toxic Chemical Substances and their Precursors Act (CWCTCSPA).

- On specific occasions, proposals have been made on the mandatory tying up of the Custom Tariff items with CAS registration numbers of toxic chemical substances and precursors, subject to declaration and control of Lists 1, 2 and 3 of CPDSUCWD. The purpose is to obtain full and accurate information both on the completed transfers and on the companies, carrying out such transfers.

In order to intensify the regional responsibility and the active counteraction of international terrorism and international organized crime,

the Republic of Bulgaria will implement in regional terms the measures provided for in the EU Action Plan in the Area of Police Co-operation. In this regard, actions will be taken for:

- Updating bilateral agreements with the Republic of Greece and the Republic of Romania for fighting cross-border crime by concluding intergovernmental agreements for police co-operation, regulating exclusively the procedures and conditions for cross-border prosecution and monitoring and provision of mutual operating assistance
- Entering into an intergovernmental agreement for police co-operation with the Republic of Macedonia and FR Yugoslavia
- Reviewing the bilateral and multilateral agreements (such as those within the Black Sea Region Economic Co-operation) with Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, etc.

DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENTS

Antiterrorism as an international obligation has not been among the legally defined roles of the military. The Armed Forces were oriented only towards major war. Any kind of even low intensity conflicts should be met with “the total national military power“. This strategy reflected the organization, equipment and training of forces. All they were focussed on initial static defense around state borders with expected counteroffensive operations within the framework of coalition forces. Later on, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact the strategy was limited in its counteroffensive phase “up to restoring the unity of the state borders”. As it was mentioned, the only significant contribution made by the military system to the counter-terrorism was made by the military strategic intelligence. The role of Bulgarian military intelligence was highly appreciated by the NATO and U.S. authorities especially when Milosevic enhanced the ethnic cleansing operations in Kosovo. It should be noted that any terrorist activities with political character have not been registered in the territory of the country during all the period of the “Milosevic’ wars”⁵.

Within Bulgaria, homeland security has long been considered the domain of police and other security services because of the distinction be-

tween “security” and “defense” in the national security tradition. In accordance with the Constitution of 1991, the Armed Forces are to guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. This means that any actions outside the defined roles, such as any action in support to the internal law enforcement agencies or to counterterrorism action (even of criminal character) could be presented as intervention in home political affairs. With a few exceptions, the defense resources allocated for such civil support missions have been focussed on support in case of emergencies, disasters and industrial accidents including those from chemical and radiological pollution. In many cases, such support has been provided through the Civil Protection Service that until late 1990s was an Armed Forces’ component and its personnel were “militarized”. All the activities were based on “emergency plans” that were designed to integrate the potential of the different agencies mentioned above with others like the local fire service, emergency health care, some of the forces that have been subordinated to ministries other than defense and agencies such like Ministry of Transportation, Bulgarian Telecom, etc. The overall co-ordination of emergency actions was based on particular regulation and made by specialized commission chaired by one of the deputy prime ministers. The Civil Protection Service staffed this commission.

Military contribution to homeland security during this period included the following basic activities:

- Military support to civilian authorities in case of natural or other disasters, other than terrorism;
- Military response in cases of hazardous materials spills, radiological incidents, response to flooding and massive forest fires;
- Military support with specialized track and air transport;
- Consequences management after any kind of accidents including terrorist attacks;
- Demining and neutralization of combat mines and ammunitions;
- Military foreign intelligence including about terrorist groups and activities in the neighboring countries;
- Military counterintelligence including about representatives of potentially dangerous radicals, both national and international;

- Permanent air control and combat duty readiness for air defense.

If this is compared with the entire developments in the U.S. a complete similarity could be identified with the formulation, approved by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The functions of defense (as opposed to protection) and other domestic civil support are added to the scope of homeland security-related activity (in accordance with colonel Steven J. Tomisek):

“Homeland Defense: The protection of US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression (also called HLD). *Civil Support:* DOD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities (also called CS)”.

As an element of the democratic way of doing politics on national security two security councils were established during the 1990s. They were designed to provide large and consensus-based background for decisions related to national security especially in critical situations in both internal and international contexts. The *Consultative Council on National Security*, attached to the President of the Republic, forms a crucial security nucleus. It is uniquely placed to bring together the President, the Prime Minister, all Ministers with responsibilities relating to national security, all parliamentary leaders and the Chief of General Staff. This Council is related to the role of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The circle of participants can be extended when necessary. The main functions of this Council are analytical and consultative, but its decisions have immediate foreign and domestic policy implications. The results of the Council’s work carries enormous weight with public opinion. The Council meets regularly to review the security situation as it pertains to Bulgaria. Extensive reports from the intelligence services are subjected to examination for policy implications. The role of the Council is most apparent in situations of crisis. During the Kosovo crisis of 1999, the Council met in various formats every couple of days to review incoming information about the quickly evolving situation and the parameters of Bulgaria’s response. Following the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, the Council met on a number of occasions to assess the immediate repercussions of the acts for Bulgarian national security. The wider implications of the new terrorist threat compelled the President to convene the Council with the specific purpose of strategic analysis. A for-

mal decision was made to discuss and elaborate amendments to the National Security Concept with the threat of terrorism in mind. Certain proposals have already been drafted and are currently being debated in Parliament. However, one of the Council's shortcomings is the insufficient number of specialists involved in its work.

There is also a *Security Council* attached to the Government. This Council was established in 1998. It functions on the basis of the National Security Plan adopted in the same year. In addition to the ministers of defense, interior, and foreign affairs, it also includes the deputy ministers of defense and foreign affairs, the secretary general of the ministry of interior and the directors of the National Intelligence Service and the National Security Service. This Council is the main institution that determines government policy in the area of national security. It analyzes incoming information on security threats, delivers short- and long-term risk assessments, proposes concrete resolution plans in situations of crisis and decides on the allocation and use of the resources of the executive. The Council also produces reports and has a permanent civil staff headed by a Secretary of the Security Council. When needed, the Council relies on expertise from the ministries of interior and defense.

In practice however, instead of employing these decision-making mechanisms, the requests to the military for support has been addressed mostly directly to the Chief of the General Staff. Utilizing procedures in place before September 11, the Chief of the General Staff retains approval authority in dealing with all, including the most sensitive requests, such as those requiring the use of forces (personnel, units, and equipment) in cases other than natural or manmade disasters. It should be stressed how different has been his/her behavior as a senior military commander when the army was part of the totalitarian political machine and later on within democratic context (even not matured). The facts of two events are telling in this regard.

In 1984 the regime issued a mandatory legislation that required Bulgarian Muslims to change their names with Slavic ones. During the consequent civil disturbances some regular military units were used mainly to stop eventual disobedience. The armed forces did not perform violent actions. Their presence should preserve any eventual spill over of civil unrest. This was a totalitarian political decision and it was executed without resistance. In 1997 after the collapse of the socialist government policy based on the ideology of "returning the role of the state" a wave of popular discontent, protests and civil disobedience was trying to bring the government down. Then, the

request by the prime minister for using at least military police against demonstrators was flatly rejected by than the chief of the general staff.

These examples demonstrate how important is the role of the senior military especially in time of crises when the circle of people involved in final decision-making is limited. In many cases chief's of the general staff role is higher than that of the minister of defense. Usually the chief military carries out internal and international policies after full or significant majority political consensus. In this equation the president is also important factor as supreme commander of the Armed Forces in both time of peace and war. However, at any level all requests for military assistance are evaluated against several criteria⁶:

- Legality: Is the requested support in compliance with applicable law?
- Political acceptability: How the requested support could be interpreted by the non-governmental political parties;
- Lethality: Is there a potential use of lethal force by or against military forces?
- Risk: How will the safety of forces be jeopardized?
- Cost: Who pays and what is the impact on the defense budget?
- Appropriateness: Is the requested mission in the Armed Forces' role to conduct?
- Readiness: What is the impact on the ability of the Armed Forces to perform its primary mission?

The new security situation (September 11, new global security relationships, NATO's internal development and enlargement etc.) necessitates a new security paradigm. The new decisive strategy for establishing a new world order, which is primarily a *security order*, reflects the (re)-construction of the entire national security sector even in countries like Bulgaria. The list of its new qualities encompasses fundamental issues such as the re-definition of roles and a new division of labor between the components of the security sector in both its internal and external aspect; a new constitutional and judicial basis for engagement, management, command and control; new forms and procedures for parliamentary and civil control together with a new content of transparency etc.

There is no doubt that the potential of existing national “policy of copying” other models has been dismantled because most of the countries with effective liberal democratic models of security sectors are currently undergoing a process of redefinition of these models (USA: total reconstruction of the security sector; Germany: constitutional changes towards new security international engagement; France: professionalization of the conscript service, and etc.). NATO and EU as organizations unavoidably did the same. Following this trend, Bulgaria together with most of the Central and East European countries faced a conceptual vacuum on how to continue with both further security sector reform and the next generation democratization measures. That is why, the security sector reform policies in these countries faced again the basic problem of defining the competencies of the various security actors, the rules of their political subordination and horizontal integration, and at the same time, the fulfillment of the conditions ensuring operational autonomy of the security services professionals.

The transformation of the main components of the national security sector - from the typical totalitarian status as of “a state within the state” - to a new size, structure and functions, acceptable from internal and international point of view is a process of extremely high political and strategic importance. Their reform in Bulgaria became a real and irreplaceable factor for strengthening of civil society, effective integration policy within the European Union and NATO and ensuring sustainable social-economic development.

Bulgarian leadership shares the opinion that appropriate security and defense structures are essential for every country in Europe for guaranteeing national security and contributing to international and regional stability. These institutions should be transparent and accountable, effective and efficient, and relevant to the security requirements and national resources. The state leadership should first of all adjust national security and defense strategies in line with the changed security environment and the new role and missions of the armed forces. Security sector reform of radical and intensive type is an absolute requirement for both national security and European integration. Special political attention, civil society oversight and free mass media monitoring will guarantee this process.

The objective of transforming the military and integrating their institutions is a tremendous challenge, if only for the sheer size of the undertaking and the complexity of the process with so many actors involved. Moreover, that process often takes place under difficult, often adverse,

circumstances due to the very nature of the political/civil actors and institutions that are supposed to lead the way. Military reform entails more than such military institutions as the officer corps, the armed force structures and planning staffs. It includes political-societal institutions like parliaments, parties, voluntary public associations and the media as well as the security experts establishments of Bulgaria and other countries. Obstacles and constraints abound. In executing its defense reform, Bulgaria has faced similar problems as most East European countries. The will to join NATO and related requirements for membership' capabilities, make the defense reform into a truly fundamental and strategic issue for Bulgaria from both a political and a military point of view.

The defense reform that was launched in 1999 was aimed at achieving four main goals:

- Making the national defense system adequate to the new political and international realities by achieving the best possible results with the scarce resources allocated for defense;
- Transforming the Ministry of Defense (MoD) into a modern European type defense administration, adequate to the requirements of democratic society and the market economy;
- Making the Armed Forces adequate to the strategic environment and capable of meeting the challenges of new types of conflicts;
- Reaching an initial level of interoperability with NATO no later than 2002 and a capacity for effective contribution in crisis response operations and collective defense. This will also turn the Armed Forces into an effective instrument of the national strategy to prepare Bulgaria for NATO and EU membership.

The achievement of these goals necessitates the application of several basic principles and approaches that reflect the new political will and strategic culture. The downsizing and restructuring of the Bulgarian military should lead to a gradual and constant increase in the Armed Forces' combat capabilities for a large spectrum of missions and operations, including anti-terrorist activities, effective border control, and civil-military emergency co-operation. At the same time, the organizational structure should be comprised of combat and support components that are adequate and interoperable with the respective formations of NATO forces. Special focus should be given to com-

mand and control systems. Their modernization should make them more operational and fully interoperable on all levels. Priority for modernization should be given to forces with highest level of peacetime combat readiness. It is expected that the modernization and rearmament process would start in full scale after the reorganization period is completed.

From an organizational point the “Plan for the Organizational Structure and Development of the Ministry of Defense by the Year 2004” (known as *Plan 2004*) together with the Annual National Program for Membership Action Plan became the core of the democratization, reorganization and integration policy. The Bulgarian political and military establishment expects to achieve Armed Forces capacities and capabilities that are adequate to neutralize security risks at the national and international levels. Developments should follow the pattern of:

- Developing a simplified and flexible structure for the Armed Forces and maintaining optimal manning levels, high mobility, efficiency, modularity, sustainability and comprehensive support in the context of ever-growing interoperability.
- Establishing and maintaining the Armed Forces’ potential to deter threats and to undertake counterstrikes. This will require: an early warning capacity, based on integration of the national information system; immediate and rapid deployment forces; anti-aircraft defense of the country and the forces; a system of measures to safeguard the survivability of forces; a reliable system for training and activation of reservists and integrated military planning; and interoperability with the NATO forces.
- Ensuring that the armed forces are capable of alternate or sudden transition from peacetime condition to wartime condition, reaching combat readiness adequate to eventual escalation of military threat.
- Making leadership, control and command adequate to the situation, objectives and tasks and ensuring their sustainability in operations in the country or abroad.
- Ensuring that the troops and forces are capable of performing diverse but specifically assigned functions and tasks; achieving and maintaining full doctrinal and technical interaction among them under all conditions with a view to interoperability with NATO forces and the capability of interacting with other governmental and civilian institutions in the fulfillment of their tasks in peace time, crises and military conflicts.

- Training the tactical and some of the operational units to improve their capacity in conducting various types of battlefield operations, with the ability to quickly shift from one type to another; ensuring that the proven traditional methods, as well as modern simulation models and simulators are mastered in the training of forces and staff.
- Paying continuous attention to the personnel so to provide clear status and model of service based on a sustainable and strong legal framework.
- Making the technological level of the armaments and equipment adequate to the tasks, compliant with NATO standards to the greatest possible extent.

BULGARIAN MILITARY AND “THE NEW WAR” – THE WAY AHEAD

The dramatic events of September 11, 2001 and the following developments necessitated a change in defense reform plans. In 2001, the *Plan 2004* implementation was reviewed and evaluated through Force Structure Review (FSR'01). NATO made some further substantial observations that helped to focus the FSR'01 better on both membership and national capacities for immediate reaction to crises. This provided arguments to the Government the Ministry of Defense to continue with the defense reform, focusing on the following three areas for the period 2002 - 2004: developing a realistic strategic direction; reviewing personnel recruitment and retention; understanding the implications of joint and combined warfare for organization, structure, core competencies, and operational concepts; re-vamping national security advisory and decision-making processes; and assessing the effects of technological and social changes on the military⁷.

The recent developments after the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that new security threats cannot be dealt with in a traditional pattern and instruments or by any separate country alone. Internal political and state failure, ethnic tensions and economic instability, organized crime and international terrorism, illegal trafficking in people, drugs and weapons, environmental pollution and attacks on information infrastructure, natural disasters and industrial accidents are non-traditional threats that are even more dangerous than traditional interstate armed

conflicts. The very nature of present security concerns needs a new and non-traditional approach based on common assessment, deliberate decision-making and joint action that is further enhanced by shared values. A new security network of willing and capable states was established.

BROADER DEFENSE CONTEXT

Environmental, demographic, economic, social changes and tensions in the region of Southeastern Europe are likely to influence regional security, but probably not so deeply as far as Bulgaria is concerned. Peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations will continue to deter security challenges. While a direct conventional attack on Bulgaria, or on the organizations it aspires to join, is unlikely this does not rule out the possibility of conflicts emerging around the fringes of Europe. Bulgaria must be prepared to do its share by deploying forces in support of NATO, EU and UN missions. Terrorist activity, whether carried out through direct terrorist action or through weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or through tactics aimed at disrupting normal life, is of uppermost concern. No country can consider itself immune from terrorist intervention. Bulgaria must be prepared to share the burden of the fight against international terrorism. Appropriate integrated security measures should prepare Bulgaria to combat any terrorist activity on its territory. Though combating terrorism is primarily a matter for the law enforcement and intelligence structures, the armed forces should develop a selected capability to support civil authorities when necessary. Regarding the development of the Bulgarian Armed Forces the following main conclusions were made after the September 11 events:

- The *Plan 2004* actualization is demanded as a real process of drawing out lessons from the course of its implementation. This process has to take into account also the conclusions of the international security environment development and the serious changes that are being outlined in the views for the use of Armed Forces.
- Special attention should be given to speeding up the forming and implementation of the fighting efficiencies of reaction forces should a crisis occur. In these formations conscripts should be rapidly replaced by professional ones.
- It is necessary to put into effect the key military infrastructure objects in condition of real technical interoperability, so to provide pos-

sibilities for adequate interaction with NATO's forces.

- Modernization of armaments and equipment has to start from those systems that are most important for the new conditions for which battle use is most probable.

REDEFINED MILITARY MISSIONS AND TASKS

The missions and tasks of the Armed Forces in responding to security challenges need to be defined in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, taking into account as the national interests and integration priorities as well as the strategic environment. More specifically, following the practice in many NATO member countries, the following missions and military tasks have been agreed for Bulgaria's armed forces⁸:

Mission 1:

Contribution to national security in peacetime

T1. Maintenance of combat readiness and combat preparedness: the Armed Forces maintain structure, composition, training, equipment and resources that ensure combat readiness and combat preparedness adequate to the military-strategic environment and in conformity with the capabilities of the country to provide resources for defense.

T2. Providing support to the population: the Armed Forces provide personnel and equipment to support the people in emergencies and especially disasters, accidents and catastrophes.

T3. Support to the security services: the Armed Forces support the state security institutions with personnel and instruments to react in particularly dangerous situations of a terrorist and other criminal character.

T4. Military support to ministries and agencies: the Armed Forces provide support to ministries and agencies with forces and means to protect and defend strategic sites, threatened by terrorist attacks and in times of armed conflicts close to the state borders.

T5. Search and rescue operations: the Armed Forces maintain and provide permanent capability to conduct search and rescue operations on

the ground and at sea independently and/or together with the respective state agencies.

T6. Participation in prevention and elimination of consequences of nuclear, chemical and bacteriologic contamination: the Armed Forces maintain capabilities and permanent readiness to react in case of a nuclear, chemical and bacteriologic contamination together with the respective ministries and state agencies.

T7. Participation in the airspace control and defence of airspace sovereignty: the Armed Forces participate in the air traffic management together with the respective state bodies. They maintain on-duty forces and means to deter aircraft violating the air sovereignty and flight regime.

T8. Participation in the sea traffic control and sea sovereignty protection: the Armed Forces participate in the control and protection of the territorial waters together with the respective state bodies. They maintain on-duty forces and means to monitor the sea traffic and force against vessels violating the sea sovereignty of the country.

T9. Military intelligence and counterintelligence: the Armed Forces build and maintain capabilities for acquiring, processing and analyzing information necessary for early warning and supporting political and military decision-making on issues related to the military aspect of national security. In performing this task the respective bodies work together and cooperate with other national bodies as stipulated in legislation, and exchange information with the respective bodies of NATO, the European Union and on bilateral and multilateral basis.

T10. Evacuation of Bulgarian citizens abroad: the Armed Forces as planned by and together with the respective state bodies and organisations are ready to, independently and in cooperation with international organizations and bodies of particular states, participate in the evacuation of Bulgarian citizens from countries where there is a threat to their lives.

T11. Public tasks: the Armed Forces provide personnel for state ceremonies and different public tasks of a nature relevant to the status assigned to them by the legislation.

Mission 2:

Contribution to global peace and stability

T12. Participation in contingents of multinational peace keeping forces: the Armed Forces participate with capable units in multinational and bilateral military formations and fulfill national obligations for logistic support of such formations.

T13. Participation in peace support and crisis response operations: the Armed Forces support national policy of contribution to international efforts for conflict prevention and crisis response. To this end, contingents and other means for participation in peace support and crisis response operations, that are adequate to the capabilities of the country, are trained and provided.

T14. Participation in humanitarian and rescue operations outside the country: the Armed Forces build and maintain capabilities and participate in humanitarian and search and rescue operations independently and as part of a coordinated international action.

T15. Transparency of military planning: the Armed Forces, in conformity with the respective legislation, provide public and limited access information on the state of the Armed Forces and the intentions for their development as well as for the basic troop and staff training activities.

T16. International military cooperation: the Armed Forces execute a permanent program for international military cooperation aimed at contributing to the enhancement of the confidence and security building measures, the improvement of bilateral and multilateral relations in the military field and exchange of military expertise.

T17. Arms control, non-distribution of weapons for mass destruction, confidence and security building measures: the Armed Forces train and provide military and civilian staff and means for activities related to arms control, non-distribution of weapons for mass destruction, confidence and security building measures.

T18. Military support to other countries: the Armed Forces, as decided respectively by the state civilian authorities, provide to other states capabilities for military and expert training, for use of ranges and other infrastructure, for joint control of air and sea sovereignty, for joint control of the export of arms and military assets.

Mission 3:

National defense

T.19. Participation in response to crises directly threatening national security: the Armed Forces, by various actions, support the political and diplomatic efforts for regulation of a crisis directly threatening national security. To this end they develop, maintain and employ forces and means for early warning and immediate reaction; Armed Forces' components are maintained at a high level of combat readiness; combat duty is given, and cooperation with other institutions necessary for an adequate reaction are maintained.

T20. Territorial defense: the Armed Forces are trained for and, when necessary, conduct combat operations in conformity with the established strategic and operational plans.

T21. Participation in coalition defense actions: in conformity with a decision of the state civilian authorities, determined by the Constitution, the Armed Forces can contribute to defense of another country or support allies and partners in collective defense efforts. To this end, the Armed Forces reach and maintain the necessary level of interoperability. Interoperability is provided for specific elements of national military and defense-related infrastructure. Interoperability is based on NATO STANAGS.

Such definition of the missions and tasks has been done for the first time within Bulgarian military policy-making. According to state political and military leadership these missions and tasks realistically reflect both the existing security environment and the capacity of Armed Forces to support national interests and policy. The expected role of this mission statement list is to become the structure and capabilities' defining factor for further modernization and development of the Armed Forces as forces of NATO member country.

FORCE STRUCTURE TRANSFORMED

The Force Structure Review critically evaluated both the concept and the implementation of Plan 2004. The concept of the Armed Forces development was amended to reflect their balanced nature, NATO adequacy

and capabilities to fulfill the whole range of missions and tasks. The conclusions and recommendations made by the task group of experts were focused on flexible structures and autonomous tactical units with significant downsizing of the number of command levels. Thus, the manpower and the equipment of the Active Forces will be advanced. Special attention was paid to fully implementing an adaptive system and methods of planning, programming and budgeting. Comprehensive training of soldiers and staff, based on NATO training doctrine and STANAGs, is designed to strengthen the interoperability with NATO forces. The legislative basis should also be adapted to become adequate to the new missions and tasks, while taking full account of the dynamic pattern of international law and the practices of using the armed forces.

The Bulgarian political and military establishment expects to achieve capacities and capabilities of the Armed Forces that are adequate to neutralize security risks on national and international level. Any further development should follow the pattern of:

- Developing of armed forces of simplified and flexible structure, optimal manning levels, high mobility, efficiency, modularity, sustainability and comprehensive support in the context of ever growing interoperability.
- Establishing and maintaining the potential of the armed forces to deter threats and to counter strike. Its main components are as follows: an early warning capacity, based on integration of the national information system, immediate and rapid deployment forces, anti-aircraft defense of the country and the forces, a system of measures to safeguard the survivability of forces, a reliable system for training and activation of reservists and integrated military planning and interoperability with the NATO forces.
- Ensuring that the armed forces are capable of alternate or sudden transition from peace-time to war-time condition, reaching fighting trim adequate to the actual military threat on a stage-by-stage basis.
- Making leadership, control and command adequate to the situation, objectives and tasks and ensuring their sustainability in operations in the country or abroad.
- Ensuring that the troops and forces are capable of performing diverse but specifically assigned functions and tasks; achieving and maintaining full doctrinal and technical interaction: among them under all conditions with a view to the interoperability with the NATO forces and the

capability of interacting with other governmental and civilian institutions in fulfilling their tasks in peace time, crises and military conflicts.

- Training the tactical and some of the operational units to improve their capacity in conducting various types of battlefield operations, with the ability to quickly shift from one type to another; ensuring that the proven traditional methods, as well as modern simulation models and simulators are mastered in the training of forces and staff.
- Paying continuous attention to the personnel so that to provide clear status and model of service based on a sustainable and strong legal framework.
- Making the technological level of the armaments and equipment adequate to the tasks, compliant with NATO standards to the greatest possible extent.

The proposed new structure of the Armed Forces reflects three basic developments: the latest NATO vision on the functional organization of the allied forces; new questions and requirements that arise in the course of actions against terrorism and self-assessment of the first two years of Plan 2004 performance. Updating of Plan 2004 will bring about the development of forces capable to perform the following operations:

Participation in a short-term (up to 6 months, without rotation) multinational peace enforcement operation with a contingent consisting of one army brigade and/or a proportional navy and air force contingent, deployed abroad,

or

Participation in a long-term (with rotation every 6 months or less) peace support operation abroad with a contingent consisting of one army battalion and/or a navy and air force equivalent, maintaining parallel capability for participation in a humanitarian operation with a contingent of up to 250 people without rotation,

and at the same time,

Maintaining the capability for territorial defence of the country from an armed aggression in one-two operational directions, independently or together with troops and forces from other countries.

Along with this, maintaining continual readiness of the military infrastructure for hosting NATO and EU contingents on our territory and interaction with NATO in airspace control and air defence.

as well as,

Maintaining capabilities for participation in collective defence operations within NATO and the EU with one reinforced brigade and/or air force and navy components.


By 2004, the Bulgarian Armed forces will be functionally organized in *Active Forces* and *Reserve Forces* - a structure that fully reflects the latest developments in NATO forces.

The Active Forces are planned to be the core of Bulgarian combat power. For this purpose it is planned to concentrate more than 70 per cent of the Armed Forces total personnel. These forces will have land, air and naval components and will be prepared to implement joint operations on every level of intensity. Their main peacetime component is the Deployable Force - manned with not less than 90 % of their wartime strength. These forces will be Bulgaria's major contribution in meeting NATO membership obligations for crisis response and collective defense. The Reserve Forces are basically prepared for defense of national territory in case of aggression. In peacetime their primary mission will be to train reserve personnel for all branches of the Armed Forces. Whenever necessary Reserve Forces can augment or rotate the Active Forces elements.

The establishment of a Joint Operations Command (JOC) is one of the major proposals in the updated *Plan 2004*. The vision is that it could operate on the National Military Command Center that is being established with U.S. financial and technological support. The Staff will maintain national crisis response military capacities provide military support to other Government agencies and local administration. Simultaneously, it will provide direct communication with and capacity for joint actions with NATO and the member countries forces when necessary.

Thus, the entire General Staff will be functionally divided into two components - operational joint planning and command, and strategic planning. This, in accordance with the authors of the FSR'01 will facilitate future consolidation of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Figure 1 presents the principal new Armed Forces structure.

Figure 1 Principal new Armed Forces structure.



* Optional

** The main staffs of the Service could be integrated into GS or independent.

OPERATIONS FOR COMBATING AND PREVENTING TERRORISM

According to Bulgarian military experts the operations against terrorism on the territory of the country should be carried out mainly as joint or even “integrated operations”. To perform such actions all the services should provide adequate forces, infrastructure and capabilities.

The Land Forces need in cases of anti-terrorist missions to develop task forces to perform military tasks like:

- Strengthening the border security through intelligence and light infantry forces in integrated actions with National Border Police Service;
- Execution of integrated operations between land forces, special operation forces and Ministry of interior services to isolate the area of crises or terrorist activities;
- Cleaning the capsulated area through joint actions of land based forces and combat support aviation;
- Direct attacks against bases of terrorists and terrorist combat groups through joint operations of special forces, supported by combat and transport aviation;
- Search and rescue operations lead by special operation forces, supported by appropriate aviation and navy;
- Convoying and guarding of captured terrorists and their transportation.

The Air Forces expect that the level of their participation in anti-terrorist operations will be about 20-25% on national territory and 80-85% abroad. In crises situation they can perform missions like the following:

- Immediate reaction against any violation of the Bulgarian air sovereignty;
- Monitoring of the risked area, air intelligence, navigation and targeting;
- Air photographic intelligence;
- Support of deployment of ground and naval forces;
- Air transportation missions;
- Combat air support;

- Air control of the area of anti-terrorist operations;
- Search and rescue operation on ground and sea.

In addition to these types of direct actions the Land and Air Forces should participate in strengthening the security of all objects of strategic considerations as nuclear power plant, the capital, refineries, river dams, chemical industry facilities, and etc.

For several years the Bulgarian governments have been trying to improve sea border and traffic control. But their efforts have been mainly departmental, lacking concerted efforts and coherent national strategy that addresses the most urgent issues. In accordance with Decree No 64 of the Council of Ministers, of 27 January 2003, on a National Integrated System of Observation and Control of Sea Spaces the creation of Naval Sovereignty Operations Center (NSOC) is at the core of the sea border control and defense. The concept of the NSOC, as suggested, is to be based on the US DOD C4ISR Architecture Framework with multiple operational nodes in coastal areas and at sea. The computer-aided model is expected to be based on MAPES (Monitor, Assess, Plan, Execute, Sustain) hierarchy and operational cycle. In this frame the Bulgarian Navy works to provide capabilities for:

- Monitoring and intelligence of enhanced naval areas in order to provide an early warning for possible terrorist actions;
 - Escorting of important ships;
 - Securing the territorial waters and port areas;
 - Identification and capturing (destroying) the ships used by terrorists in integrated operations with the Naval Border Police;
 - Transportation of special operations forces;
 - Combat search and rescue;
 - Participation in international embargo operations, etc.

The integration of such capabilities into a coherent joint operational concept for effective prevention or direct combating terrorism has still to be further developed and acquired. The experience that the Bulgarian military have collected through participation in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and especially from *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan is a good start but will be not enough. Joint staff work and multinational exercises on bilateral,

regional on NATO bases would be extremely useful. Documentation of such operations requires a package of field manuals and instructions to be created that could serve a regular and authoritative basis for training and actions. Also, specific efforts for the modernization of the equipment should be performed for as high as possible a level of interoperability to be provided.

An important anti- and counter-terrorist element is the co-operation in intelligence - both national and specific military. The early warning measures are keys for the success and political and expert steps towards appropriate level of integration should be provided.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that among all the security sector institutions, the Bulgarian military are less prepared for immediate involvement in anti- and counter-terrorist operation. During the last two years the debate how to adapt the forces hangover from the Warsaw Pact time to the current and near-future national, regional and Euro-Atlantic realities was complicated with discussions on their role in “the new war” against terrorism. The campaign for disarming Iraq fostered the political and expert consensus that the specific units, equipment and infrastructure should be a priority as should the ability to react both independently and in a multinational format to this new challenge. The Bulgarian Government has supported the United States and its allies from the very beginning of the diplomatic efforts to disarm Iraq, being one of the three members of the UN Security Council, along with the UK and Spain, on whose support the US could count.

This deep engagement reflects the defense reform orientation simultaneously with expected transformations in the other organizations of the national security sector. According to senior Bulgarian military officials the role of the military in preventing and combating terrorism should be enhanced because: a) there is not any more clear distinction between external (military) and internal (police) security, b) there is no longer a fixed line between terrorism (political, criminal) and war (armed conflicts with different intensity), and because the armed forces maintain offensive capacities that could be employed on multinational basis to prevent terrorist actions and human catastrophies.

The implementation of this view is expected to be performed through the newly introduced (April 2003) Strategic Defense Review. The political framework of this review stipulates that the Armed Forces should establish the capacity to address the new security challenges in internal and international context together with NATO and member countries' forces. However, further intensive consultations, joint research and training with the US and other partner countries' forces and experts should be carried out. Provided this, the Bulgarian militaries will augment their capacities for effective contribution to both national authorities and the international democratic community efforts to counter global terrorism in all of its forms.

Notes

¹ Valeri Ratchev, Colonel Bulgarian AF. Presented views are only those of the author.

² The National security concept is a document similar to the National security strategy of the U.S. It is issued by the Government and approved by the Parliament. There are specific regulations when the new draft to be presented.

³ The Military doctrine is political-military document designed to connect the National security concept with the National military strategy.

⁴ Security sector is a descriptive explanation of all the national institutions, which primary aim is to contribute to the national security, There is not a legal definition of the term but for analytical purpose and following the recommendations of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe the security sector of Bulgaria consists of : the Bulgarian Army (traditional name for the Armed Forces), National Intelligence Service (foreign intelligence), National Security Service (counterintelligence), National Police Service, National Service of Gendarmerie (paramilitary force with police functions), National Border Police Service (control of the ground and maritime borders), National Guard Service (for guarding VIP and critical infrastructure objects), National Service for Combating Organised Crime and National Service of Fire and Emergency Safety.

⁵ The threat of such attacks was expected in Bulgaria because the Nuclear power plant is about 100 km and the capital Sofia only 40 km from the Serbian border, and Kosovo is about 60 km. ⁶ This approach is based on Colonel Steven J. Tomisek's ideas from Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense, INSS NDU, Washington D.C.

⁷ Some interesting ideas were presented by Anthony C. Zinni in A Military for the 21st Century: Lessons from the Recent Past

⁸ The list should be elevated to a doctrine in order to receive a legal status for defense planners.